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Abstract 
Scott Wilson Dunn: Perceptions of Bias in a Changing Media Environment: 
The Hostile Media Effect for Objective and Ideological Media 
(Under the direction of Anne Johnston) 
 
 This dissertation broadens scholarly understanding of perceptions of media bias by 
examining the hostile media effect in the context of explicitly ideological media.  The hostile 
media effect states that people who have strong attitudes on a given issue will perceive media 
coverage of that issue as hostile to their attitudes, even while people with the opposing 
attitude may see the same coverage as biased in the other direction.  However, most previous 
research on the hostile media effect has been based on stimuli that ostensibly come from 
traditional mainstream media sources that profess to uphold a standard of objectivity.  This 
study incorporated stimulus articles said to come from media sources with explicit 
conservative or liberal biases.  The study found that, for an article about abortion, 
participants tended to base their perceptions of bias on the media outlet’s explicit ideology.  
However, for an article about the economy, participants who supported government 
intervention to solve economic problems perceived the article as biased regardless of the 
media outlet’s stated ideology, lending partial support to the traditional hostile media effect.  
In addition to testing the differences in perceived bias for ideological and neutral media, this 
study also tested a number of antecedents and consequences that have been identified in 
previous research on the hostile media effect.  For both articles, perceptions of general media 
bias predicted perceptions that the articles and their media outlet were biased.  Group 
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identification, attitude extremity, connection between attitudes and moral conviction, media 
cynicism, and political tolerance did not predict perceptions of bias.  For the abortion article, 
perceived bias predicted perceptions of how credible and informative the media outlet was 
and perceptions of public opinion about abortion, but not how interesting the media outlet 
was or levels of general media indignation.  For the economy article, perceived bias predicted 
all perceptions of how credible, informative, and interesting the media outlet was, but not 
media indignation or perceived public opinion.  Implications of these findings and 
suggestions for future research are discussed.  
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Chapter I: Introduction and Literature Review 
 Accusations of media bias have been a major part of political discourse for, at least, 
decades.  Politicians have accused the press of biases that swayed electoral outcomes or 
public perceptions.  Following the 1932 United States presidential election, Franklin 
Roosevelt’s campaign manager and political mastermind James Farley argued that 
newspapers treated Roosevelt unfairly (Farley, 1938).  In his concession speech following the 
1962 California gubernatorial election, Richard Nixon lambasted reporters whom he believed 
had failed to accurately report his statements during the campaign.  In an infamously ironic 
statement, Nixon warned reporters, “Just think about how much you’re going to be missing.  
You won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore” (Nixon, 1962).   
 Several years later, Nixon’s vice-president Spiro Agnew (1969) gave several 
speeches in which he argued that the television networks exerted undue influence on public 
opinion.  Agnew presaged arguments made by subsequent media critics (from all sides of the 
political aisle) that television news blended facts and commentary, imposed limits on which 
issues audiences thought about, reflected the interests of an elitist segment of the American 
population, and exercised a monopoly of power.  The list of other politicians who have 
explicitly leveled charges of bias includes Democrats such as Adlai Stevenson and Bill 
Clinton and Republicans such as Dwight Eisenhower, Dan Quayle, Bob Dole, and George 
W.  Bush (see Alterman, 2003; Dalasi & Allen, 2000).  In the most recent United State 
presidential election, various supporters of Republican candidate John McCain, Democratic 
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candidate Barack Obama, and Democratic hopeful Hillary Clinton argued that there was 
rampant media bias against their preferred candidates (Farhi, 2008; Wilson, 2008). 
 Accusations of media bias have also come from academics and from journalists 
themselves.  A favorite topic among conservative commentators is the liberal bias of the 
media, the existence of which is seen as self-evident (see, e.g., Keeley, 1971; Bozell, 2004).  
At the same time, a number of liberal commentators have argued that the press exhibits a 
conservative, pro-business bias (e.g.  Liebling, 1961/1975; Bagdikian, 1983; Lee & Solomon, 
1990/1992; Alterman, 2003).  Websites for media watchdog groups such as Media Matters 
for America (http://mediamatters.org) and Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting 
(http://www.fair.org) offer daily evidence of conservative news bias, while rival groups like 
Accuracy in Media (http://www.aim.org) and Media Research Center 
(http://www.mediaresearch.org) counter with evidence of liberal bias.  Although the evidence 
offered by commentators may be convincing in isolation, it is purely anecdotal and does not 
necessarily indicate the existence of systematic ideological biases. 
 The purpose of the study proposed here is to develop scholarly understanding of 
media bias by examining the hostile media effect, a theory that focuses attention on audience 
members’ perceptions of bias.  The wealth of divergent arguments about media bias makes it 
difficult for media scholars to examine bias empirically.  Some researchers have followed the 
lead of the popular literature, focusing on media content in an attempt to determine whether 
or not bias is present.  Other researchers have focused on audience perceptions of bias.  This 
approach to research recognizes that bias is often in the eye of the beholder rather than a 
characteristic of media content that can be objectively observed.  The literature review of this 
proposal will briefly review several approaches to studying media bias and then focus on the 
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hostile media effect, the primary theory used to explain audience perceptions of bias. 
 Much of the research on media content lacks the kind of empirical reliability and 
precision that would be necessary to convincingly establish the widespread existence of 
media bias.  Kuypers (2002) performed rhetorical analyses of several high-profile speeches 
and compared them to media coverage of those speeches.  Kuypers argued that instead of 
accurately reporting what was said in these speeches, the media reinterpreted their themes to 
reflect an establishment-liberal point of view.  As a result, conservative voices are kept out of 
media, as are the voices of non-establishment liberals, such as Louis Farrakhan.  
Unfortunately, Kuypers’s analyses were based on a handful of case studies, so his work did 
not convincingly establish that liberal media bias is widespread.   
 Efron (1971) took a slightly more empirical approach to studying liberal bias in 
media.  In addition to citing a wealth of anecdotal evidence, she analyzed hours of television 
network news during the 1968 United States presidential election.  Her analysis indicated that 
the networks presented a balance of positive and negative information about Democratic 
candidate Hubert Humphrey while presenting overwhelmingly negative information about 
his Republican opponent, Nixon.  She also found evidence that the networks presented 
overwhelmingly negative information about the Vietnam War and generally reflected liberal 
positions on most of the issues she studied.  Although Efron’s analysis was quantitative in 
nature, it did not meet the standards of empirical content analysis, as she appears to have 
performed the coding herself without using an independent coder in order to measure the 
reliability of her coding scheme.  There is no assurance offered that her data were the result 
of anything but her own admitted conservative perspective shaping her perspective of the 
content she was studying. 
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 Even the most empirically rigorous studies of media bias have struggled to find a way 
to objectively define bias.  Some researchers have simply assessed the political leanings of 
journalists and deduced that these leanings would lead to biased news coverage.  Survey data 
reported by Schneider and Lewis (1985) showed that on the vast majority of issues 
journalists were more liberal than the public at large (see also Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter, 
1986).  In fact, journalists were more liberal than other college-educated professionals, a 
group that tends to be more liberal than the general public.  While the researchers did not use 
any statistical tests of significance, the magnitude of most of their findings was large enough 
to suggest that the differences were not due to random chance.  More recently, a widely-cited 
survey by Povich (1996) found that nearly 90% of journalists covering Washington politics 
voted for Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential election, which many conservatives have cited 
as evidence of liberal media bias.  In contrast, a survey conducted by Croteau (1999) showed 
that on economic issues, such as taxes, health care policy, concentration of corporate power, 
and free trade, journalists were significantly more conservative than the general public.  
Although these studies may show that journalists tend to hold political positions that differ 
from those of the general public, such a finding cannot be considered evidence of media bias 
without demonstrating that actual media content reflects these leanings. 
 Several studies have used content analysis to examine whether systematic biases exist 
in media content.  Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt (1998) studied the newspapers serving a 
stratified sample of counties during the 1992 United States presidential election.  Their 
content analysis showed that the newspapers’ coverage tended to be fairly balanced, but was 
slightly more negative toward George Bush and (to a lesser extent) Ross Perot while being 
somewhat more positive toward Bill Clinton.  There was a negative correlation (r = -.68) 
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between the valance of the reporting on Bush and Clinton, suggesting that newspapers tended 
to favor one candidate over the other, but all of the newspapers presented a substantial 
amount of positive and negative information about all three candidates.  These findings show 
that American newspapers are considerably less partisan than they were earlier in American 
history (and less partisan than the newspapers in many contemporary nations).  Domke et al. 
(1997) found similar results in their content analysis of newspapers and television news 
covering the same election.  Similarly, Waldman and Devitt (1998) analyzed photographs of 
Clinton and Dole that appeared in newspapers during the election and found that whichever 
candidate was leading in public opinion polls at the time tended to be portrayed more 
positively.  Their results indicated that media bias tends to favor front-running candidates 
regardless of partisan affiliation. 
 Other studies have looked at biased coverage across multiple election contexts.  Shah, 
Watts, Domke, and Fibison (1999) analyzed media coverage of the 1984, 1988, 1992, and 
1996 United States presidential elections.  They found that the candidates of each party 
received roughly the same amount of coverage during each election.  The valence of that 
coverage was slightly more positive for Democratic candidates, but factors other than 
candidate partisanship had stronger influences on the valence of media coverage.  
Specifically, challengers tended to fare better than incumbents.  When the data were analyzed 
separately for news coverage of economics the valence of the coverage was closely tied to 
the performance of the economy during that election.  When the economy was doing well, 
economic coverage tended to be positive for the incumbent, but when the economy was in 
recession coverage tended to be negative toward the incumbent.  
 Niven (1999) analyzed newspaper coverage of governors during times when crime 
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and unemployment rates were either rising or falling.  By comparing governors from 
opposing parties in the same states during similar conditions, he found that Republican and 
Democratic governors were treated similarly by the newspapers.  These studies of bias in 
election contexts indicate that candidates from the two major American political parties tend 
to receive comparable coverage.  This finding casts doubt on the existence of widespread 
partisan bias in mainstream American news media. 
 The many studies that have examined media bias during elections cannot all be 
reviewed here, but D’Alessio and Allen (2000) analyzed data from 59 studies of bias in 
United States presidential elections from 1948 through 1996.  While some of these individual 
studies showed evidence of bias in specific media outlets during specific elections, the meta-
analysis showed no evidence of bias in newspaper coverage and a very slight (but statistically 
significant) pro-Democrat bias in television coverage.  These results suggest that the biases 
seen in very specific contexts do not reflect a sustained, high-magnitude, systematic bias 
across elections and across all media. 
 A recent study by Covert and Wasburn (2009) sought to study media bias beyond 
election contexts.  These researchers analyzed coverage of four issues (crime, the 
environment, gender, and poverty) in four newsmagazines from 1975 to 2000.  Two of the 
magazines, Newsweek and Time are usually seen as mainstream publications that should, 
presumably, aspire to objective coverage of issues.  The other two magazines chosen for the 
study explicitly represent either a conservative (National Review) or liberal (The 
Progressive) perspective.  Their methodology involved analyzing coverage of these issue 
based on the sources used for stories, the potential costs identified with each issue, causes 
identified for the issues, and solutions proposed for each issue.  By examining each of these 
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four factors, the researchers hoped to evaluate bias in a more holistic and objective manner 
than previous studies. 
 Covert and Wasburn’s (2009) study found that Newsweek’s coverage of the 
environment, gender, and poverty was just slightly biased toward liberal positions, while the 
magazine’s coverage of crime was slightly biased toward conservative positions.  Time’s 
coverage of all four issues was slightly left of center.  Unsurprisingly, both mainstream news 
outlets were considerably more moderate than the two partisan publications, which were 
notably biased in the expected directions on each of the four issues.  Although this study’s 
methodology was more rigorous than many content analyses of media bias, it also illustrates 
that even with careful attention to methods it is difficult to evaluate bias.  For example, the 
authors note that the bias scores for National Review’s coverage of crime had a large 
standard deviation, complicating their statistical analyses.  They attributed this large variance 
to the wide variety of conservative positions on drug crime.  Some National Review articles 
advocated for the decriminalization of drugs on libertarian grounds, while others argued for 
tougher drug laws.  Under the study’s methodology articles in the former category would be 
coded as “liberal,” but either of these positions could legitimately be considered 
conservative, depending on how the term is defined.  Drug legislation is just one of several 
political issues that resist easy ideological labeling, making it difficult to put news coverage 
into tidy ideological categories. 
 Other studies have used less direct measures to examine media bias outside of 
election contexts.  Groseclose and Milyo (2005) coded citations of think tanks and policy 
groups in news content.  They compared the citations of these groups in media content to 
citations by members of Congress in the Congressional Record.  Based on the ideological 
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leanings of the Representatives and Senators who cited them, these policy groups were 
placed on an ideological continuum that could be used to assess ideological leanings of 
media outlets.  For example, if a media outlet quoted a think tank that was also quoted by a 
liberal member of Congress, the authors would see this citation as evidence of the media 
outlet’s liberal bias.  Using this measure, almost every media outlet the authors studied was 
determined to have a bias that was more liberal than the average member of Congress.  
However, just as striking was the fact that all of the media outlets fell fairly close to the 
center of the ideological spectrum, defined as the ideological perspective of the average 
member of Congress.  In fact, of the 20 media outlets included in the analysis, only one was 
deemed to be more liberal than the average Congressional Democrat, and that one was only 
slightly more liberal.  No media outlet was found to be more conservative than the average 
Congressional Republican.  In summary, this study’s results indicated that mainstream media 
outlets are more liberal than the average member of Congress, but more centrist than the 
average member of either party’s Congressional delegation. 
 The previously cited studies suggest that media bias is extremely difficult to measure 
empirically.  These studies relied either on very subjective judgments made by the authors 
(which were surely shaped by their own ideological leanings) or on operational definitions of 
bias that fail to account for all of the possible forms of bias that could emerge in news 
coverage.  For example, Groseclose and Milyo’s (2005) approach to studying media bias was 
based solely on media citations of think tanks and policy groups.  Obviously, such groups 
constitute only a fraction of the sources that journalists quote in news stories.  Although it 
was creative, the method used in this study relied on several assumptions, any of which could 
introduce error into the analysis if they are not met.  The authors assumed that the ratings of 
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Representatives and Senators’ ideological leanings (which came from another organization’s 
analysis) are valid, that policy groups cited by a member of Congress should uniformly 
reflect that person’s ideological leanings, and that citing a particular group in a news story 
reflects approval of that group’s ideology.   
 Several of Groseclose and Milyo’s (2005) counter-intuitive findings raise concerns 
about whether those assumptions are met or not.  For example, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) was labeled as a right-of-center organization, largely because it was 
frequently quoted by conservative Senator Mitch McConnell to support his opposition to 
campaign finance regulation.  While the ACLU does not take liberal positions as consistently 
as its conservative critics (e.g., http://www.stoptheaclu.com) claim (as evidenced by the 
organization’s agreement with McConnell on the campaign finance issue), the idea that it is, 
overall, a center-right organization lacks face validity.  Similarly, the final analysis shows 
that the Wall Street Journal is the most liberal news outlet included in the study, the only 
news outlet that is more liberal than the average Democrat in Congress.  This finding is based 
on the Journal’s news coverage, rather than its editorial page, and it is not surprising that the 
news coverage would not necessarily reflect the editorial page’s conservative perspective.  
However, the magnitude of the Journal’s liberal bias found in this study is too great to accept 
without subjecting it to further scrutiny.  As such, the Groseclose and Milyo (2005) study 
does not seem to provide a terribly precise accounting of media bias.  The other content 
analyses cited above (Domke et al., 1997; Dalton et al., 1998; Waldman & Devitt, 1998; 
Shah et al., 1999; Niven, 1999; Covert & Wasburn, 2009) faced similar difficulties.   
 Despite the difficulty of studying media bias empirically, the findings of the studies 
cited above do have value for understanding the extent of media bias.  Overall, they suggest 
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that media bias does not consistently or overwhelmingly favor liberal or conservative 
ideology, at least for ostensibly objective media outlets.  Non-ideological factors such as 
candidate popularity and the state of the economy are more likely to bias coverage than 
partisanship or ideology.  Additionally, those studies that do identify some bias (usually for 
the liberal side) show that the magnitude of this bias is small.  Overall, the studies seem to 
indicate that, if anything, mainstream news media display a centrist (or, possibly, slightly 
liberal) bias.   
 The lack of consistent evidence of media bias suggests an important question for 
scholars of media: If the news media are not biased, why do so many people believe they 
are? One possibility is suggested in research by Domke, Watts, Shah, and Fan (1999) and 
Watts, Domke, Shah, and Fan (1999).  In these two articles, the researchers compared 
content analyses of news coverage with public opinion polling during the 1988, 1992, and 
1996 United States presidential elections.  Over the course of these three elections, public 
perception that media were biased against conservative candidates consistently increased.  
However, the authors only found evidence of a pro-Democrat bias during the 1992 election.  
What they found instead was that news coverage increasingly included claims of liberal bias, 
usually coming from Republican candidates or party officials.  The authors’ analysis showed 
that public perceptions of media bias did not correspond to actual biased news content, but 
did correspond to the number of times claims of liberal media bias were included in news 
coverage.   
In fact, Domke et al. (1999) found that elite allegations of media bias tended to 
actually increase following positive coverage of Republican candidates, suggesting that 
Republicans strategically used periods of positive coverage to make allegations at times 
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when they were most likely to be reported uncritically.  Additionally, in the 1992 and 1996 
elections allegations of media bias increased as the Republican candidates’ poll numbers 
dropped.  According to the authors, this finding indicates that Republican leaders use 
allegations of media bias as a rhetorical strategy to discourage citizens from taking news 
coverage seriously during times when the campaign is going well for the Democratic 
candidate.  Such a strategy would probably be effective, as research by Duck, Terry, and 
Hogg (1998) indicates that members of a losing political party are more likely to perceive 
media as biased in order to explain their party’s lack of success.  This line of research 
suggests that perceptions of media bias among the public result, in part, from a concerted 
effort by conservative and Republican political elites to convince the public to be distrustful 
of the “liberal media.” 
 The findings of Domke et al. (1999) and Watts et al. (1999) suggest one explanation 
for perceptions of media bias, but they do not necessarily account for all perceptions of bias.  
Their data suggest that it is rare for media outlets to give voice to those who claim that media 
have a conservative bias, yet some citizens still believe that media have such a bias.  
Additionally, their analyses do not account for all of the variation in public perceptions of 
liberal media bias, suggesting that other theoretical mechanisms are partially responsible for 
those perceptions.  One mechanism that has received a great deal of empirical support is the 
hostile media effect, which states that partisans see media biased against their own 
perspective, even when non-partisans would see the coverage as neutral.   
 The purpose of this dissertation is to strengthen scholarly understanding of the hostile 
media effect.  While previous research has convincingly established the existence of the 
hostile media effect, less is known about when and why this effect occurs.  It is important to 
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strengthen scholarly understanding of this phenomenon because perceptions of media bias 
may have substantial effects on citizens’ willingness to access and engage political 
information.  Perceptions of bias may cause citizens to avoid certain news media, perhaps 
even avoiding political information in general.  This study will use an experimental design to 
assess whether the hostile media effect functions differently in response to explicitly 
ideological as opposed to ostensibly neutral media.  Additionally, a number of antecedent 
variables and consequences of perceived media bias will be examined.  While these variables 
have been examined individually in previous studies, the present study will use multivariate 
methods to test these variables simultaneously. 
Hostile Media Effect 
 Researchers have long recognized that the effect of a communicative message is 
based more on how audiences perceive the message than on any objective characteristic of 
the message itself.  For example, Berlo, Lemert, and Mertz (1969) argued that research on 
source credibility should focus on participant evaluations of credibility, not pseudo-objective 
traits of credible communicators manipulated by researchers.  Stevenson and Greene (1980) 
extended this logic to the study of media bias, arguing that “who observes must be considered 
simultaneously with what is observed.  We can understand news consumers’ perceptions of 
bias better if we try to observe it from their perspective” (p. 116).  They designed an 
experiment during the 1976 United States presidential election in which participants read 
positive and negative news articles about the candidates, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.  
Although their research design produced results that were difficult to interpret, they did show 
that the participants processed articles they perceived as biased differently from articles they 
did not perceive as biased.  This finding presaged later research on the hostile media 
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phenomenon.  This section of the dissertation will review the literature establishing the 
existence of the hostile media effect and then review research on specific variables related to 
the theory that will be examined in this study.   
 The hostile media effect was established as a media theory by Vallone, Ross, and 
Lepper (1985) in their research on perceptions of media coverage of the 1982 civilian 
massacre in Lebanese refugee camps.  This study is seen as the beginning of research on the 
hostile effect both because it clearly articulated and tested the theory and because it was the 
first study to use the term “hostile media phenomenon” (Vallone et al., 1985, p. 577).  In 
their study, pro-Arab, pro-Israeli, and neutral viewers watched television news coverage of 
the Beirut massacre and reported their perceptions of it.  Partisans differed from each other 
and from neutral viewers in their perceptions of the news stories’ overall treatment of Israel, 
the standards applied to Israel in relation to other countries, the degree of attention focused 
on Israel’s role in relation to that of other countries, and the perceived strength of the case for 
Israel minus the perceived strength of the case against Israel.  Additionally, pro-Arab viewers 
differed from neutral and pro-Israel viewers (who did not differ with each other) on the 
percentage of perceived favorable and unfavorable references to Israel, estimated percentage 
of neutral viewers who would become more negative toward Israel after viewing the news 
coverage, and perceptions of the personal views of the editors of the programs.  These 
findings demonstrated the hostile media effect by showing that pro-Israel participants viewed 
media coverage as biased in favor of the pro-Arab side while pro-Arab participants saw the 
same media coverage as biased toward the pro-Israel side.  Thus, each side saw the content as 
“hostile” to its point of view. 
 A number of subsequent studies have further demonstrated hostile media perceptions 
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in both experimental and survey-based contexts.  One of the most comprehensive field-based 
studies was performed by Dalton et al. (1998).  As noted above, these researchers performed 
a content analysis on newspapers serving a stratified sample of counties in the United States 
during the 1996 presidential elections.  Although they found scant evidence of systematic 
bias, the survey data showed that some respondents perceived a bias in their newspapers’ 
coverage.  While a plurality of respondents perceived no bias, most of those who did see a 
newspaper bias believed it favored Clinton (with Bush a distant second and Perot and even 
more distant third).  When specific respondents were matched to their newspapers, there was 
only a very modest (but statistically significant) correlation between perceived bias and the 
bias found in actual newspaper coverage (r = .09 for news reports, .11 for editorials, and .13 
for editorial endorsements).  This relationship was strongest for those newspapers that 
showed less variation in their coverage (presenting a relatively consistent partisan message) 
and was not present for newspapers with high variation in coverage.   
 In support of the hostile media effect, party identification had a negative effect on the 
ability to accurately identify the direction of newspapers’ evaluative content ( = -.14, p < 
.05) when included in a model with the newspapers’ actual evaluative content.  The effect of 
party identification was strongest for participants who reported paying little or no attention to 
the campaign, smaller but still significant for those who reported paying some attention, and 
not significant for those who reported paying a lot of attention.  Additionally, significant 
relationships between perceived coverage and actual coverage were found only for those who 
paid some attention to the campaign, while those who either paid a lot of attention or who 
paid little or no attention showed no relationship. Although, as noted above, this study does 
not indicate that newspapers are overwhelmingly biased, it does provide convincing evidence 
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of the hostile media effect, since party identification is the only variable that had major 
effects throughout the analysis. 
 One interesting aspect of the hostile media effect is that it seems to be a reaction that 
occurs specifically in response to media content.  In fact, the hostile media effect could be 
considered inconsistent with research showing that people tend to assume that other people 
share their views, a phenomenon sometimes called “biased assimilation” (Lord, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1979, p. 2098; see also Fields & Schuman, 1976).  In light of the hostile media 
effect, these findings suggest that people perceive media messages as biased against their 
opinions while perceiving non-media messages as biased in favor of their own opinions.  
Gunther and Schmitt (2004) examined the difference between media and non-media content 
by manipulating a stimulus so that is appeared to be either an article from USA Today or a 
student-authored essay (see also Schmitt, Gunther, & Liebhart, 2004).  The two versions of 
the stimulus contained identical text about the issue of genetically modified foods and the 
participants were recruited from organizations that advocate for each side of that issue.  The 
authors hypothesized that responses to the newspaper article would demonstrate a hostile 
media perception while responses to the student essay would demonstrate biased 
assimilation.   
 The article stimulus was, indeed, perceived as biased against the participants’ views 
on each side for five out of six of the dependent variables, consistent with the hostile media 
hypothesis.  Depending on the specific dependent variable, there was limited support for the 
biased assimilation pattern in the essay condition.  When the dependent variable was 
measured in terms of the portrayals of genetically modified foods, opponents of GM foods, 
and supporters of GM foods, there was no significant difference between the two groups.  
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When the dependent variables were the percentage of the content that was favorable toward 
GM foods, percentage that was unfavorable, and the author’s bias, the results were consistent 
with the biased assimilation hypothesis.  Interpretation of these results was complicated by 
the fact that the groups on each side of the issue differed on a number of demographic 
variables.  In order to test whether this difference was due to differences in perceived reach, 
as hypothesized, the researchers asked participants to assess the likelihood of the stimulus 
influencing (a) themselves and (b) other neutral people.  The hypothesis was that participants 
would predict that the stimulus would influence themselves more in the direction of their 
previously held views and influence other people to support the opposing view.  This 
hypothesis held up, as participants in the article condition predicted that the article would 
have virtually no influence on them and a negative (counter-attitudinal) influence on others, 
while participants in the essay condition predicted a highly positive (pro-attitudinal) 
influence on themselves and a less positive influence on others.  Thus, the essay was seen as 
leading to more attitude-consistent persuasion on both the participants themselves and on 
others, but within each condition the influence on others was expected to be more counter-
attitudinal than the influence on the participants themselves.   
 Gunther and Liebhart (2006) built on Gunther and Schmitt’s (2004) study by 
separating the effects of source and reach on hostile media perceptions.  The authors 
speculated that the hostile media effect might depend on audience members believing that the 
stimulus would be read by large numbers of people who could be swayed by biased 
coverage.  If they were correct that the effect depended on the perceived reach of the 
message, then an essay ostensibly written by a journalist but not published in a far-reaching 
media source should not invoke hostile media perceptions.  In order to test this possibility, 
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the stimulus was presented as either a class essay or an article in USA Today and the source 
was also manipulated by telling participants that the stimulus was written by either a student 
or a journalist.  As the authors had hypothesized, participants in the journalist condition 
perceived the stimulus as more counter-attitudinal than did participants in the student 
condition and participants in the USA Today condition perceived it as more counter-
attitudinal than did participants in the essay condition.  In other words, the hostile media 
effect occurred if the stimulus was presented as a news article or if the author was said to be 
a professional journalist.  There seems to be something about news media and journalists that 
causes partisans to perceive bias, even if the message is not published in a media outlet.   
The conclusion that the hostile media phenomenon is specifically related to media 
content was further supported by Huge and Glynn (2010).  These researchers found that 
supporters of candidates in a gubernatorial election perceived roughly the same magnitude of 
media bias against their preferred candidate whether the media outlet in question was a major 
metropolitan newspaper or a smaller-circulation newspaper.  While previous research 
suggests that the hostile media effect is dependent on the perceived reach inherent in media 
content (as opposed to other types of communicative messages), Huge and Glynn’s finding 
suggests that the media outlet does not need to have a particularly wide reach in order for it 
to invoke the hostile media effect.   
By contrast, Gunther, Miller, and Liebhart (2009) found that an article was perceived 
as less counter-attitudinal when it was presented as being from a local newspaper as opposed 
to a national newspaper (and even less counter-attitudinal when it was presented as a student 
essay).  However, this study’s results are difficult to interpret, as the stimulus article was 
uniformly perceived as pro-attitudinal regardless of the ostensible source.  Thus, it could be 
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said that the participants actually perceived the local newspapers (and, to an even greater 
extent, student essays) as being biased in a way that was consistent with their attitudes, while 
they saw the national newspapers as more neutral.  Nevertheless, regardless of whether a 
specific media outlet’s reach affects the extent to which its content is perceived as counter-
attitudinal, these studies support the assertion that the hostile media phenomenon is triggered 
by media content, such that people view media content as biased but non-media messages as 
being consistent with their attitudes. 
 The research cited thus far has established that people tend to view media content as 
biased against their opinions, at least in regards to issues that are important to them.  It has 
also established that this effect is specific to media content.  Messages that are not presented 
as coming from media sources are perceived as either being unbiased or biased in a direction 
that supports the audience member’s opinion.  Based on this research, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: Participants with a non-neutral attitude on an issue will see media coverage of 
that issue as biased toward the other side. 
Influence of media outlet ideology.  One of the major goals of this study is to 
compare perceptions of media that take an explicit ideological perspective and perceptions of 
media that are ostensibly neutral.  Previous experimental research on the hostile media effect 
has used stimuli that were (or appeared to be from) ostensibly neutral sources such as USA 
Today or network television news programs.  This research approach reflects the ideal of 
objectivity that dominated most news media throughout the twentieth century.  Recent 
decades have seen the emergence of many new media outlets that do not necessarily share 
that ideal.  Cable news, blogs, talk radio, and other media outlets offer consumers content 
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that is often transparently ideological or partisan in nature.  These new media options 
resemble earlier eras in American history, when media were highly partisan (Schudson, 
1999).  Considering these changes in the media landscape, it is necessary to reexamine the 
hostile media effect to see if people react to partisan news sources the same way they react to 
neutral news sources. 
 The most obvious expectation would be that audience members would see a liberal 
bias in a media outlet that labels itself “liberal” and a conservative bias in a media outlet that 
labels itself “conservative.” However, research has not supported this assumption 
consistently.  While they did not examine the hostile media effect directly, Austin and Dong 
(1994) studied the effect of source credibility on judgments of news story believability.  They 
presented their stimulus as an article from either the New York Times (high credibility), the 
Star (low credibility), or the fictional Louisville Chronicle (ambiguous credibility).  They 
found that the content of the article influenced judgments of believability but news outlet did 
not.  This finding suggests that perceptions of believability (and, perhaps, bias) are not 
strongly affected by factors related to the news outlet itself. 
 Coe et al. (2008) examined the effects of media outlet ideology more directly.  They 
had self-identified liberal and conservative participants view comparable segments from 
CNN, Fox News, or The Daily Show.  As hypothesized by the authors, conservatives saw the 
segments from The Daily Show as biased and also rated The Daily Show in general as a 
biased program.  Liberals said they believed Fox News was generally biased, although they 
did not rate the specific segments used in the experiment as biased.  Neither conservatives 
nor liberals saw CNN as biased.  Counter to expectations, liberals also saw a high level of 
bias in The Daily Show.  Although suggestive, the findings of this study are difficult to 
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generalize.  The Daily Show is very different from CNN or Fox News.  The former is a 
comedy show designed to entertain that generally makes no attempt to present a neutral or 
balanced portrayal of politics.  By contrast, CNN and Fox News present themselves as 
objective (or, in Fox’s case, “fair and balanced”) news sources that only air opinionated 
programming during certain hours of the day.  While critics may question whether either 
cable station is truly objective, their biases will tend to be more subtle than those of The 
Daily Show.  This limitation is especially salient since the researchers used regular news clips 
from CNN and Fox News, rather than excerpts from their more opinion-oriented 
programming.  Had the stimuli come from CNN’s Lou Dobbs Tonight or Fox News’s The 
O’Reilly Factor, the perceptions of bias might have been comparable to those of The Daily 
Show. 
 In another study that did not support the expectation that perceptions of media bias 
would be directly influenced by the stated bias of a media outlet,  Arpan and Raney (2003) 
had participants read an article about misconduct involving football players from (in equal 
amounts) their own school and their rival school.  The article was presented as being from (1) 
the participants’ hometown newspaper, (2) the rival school’s hometown newspaper, or (3) a 
third, presumably neutral, city’s newspaper.  Across conditions, participants perceived the 
article to be biased against the participants’ school, as predicted by the hostile media effect.  
Although participants may have been expected to see their hometown newspaper as the least 
biased and rival school’s newspaper as most biased, they actually saw the neutral newspaper 
as the most biased.  The differences between the perceived biases of the hometown and rival 
newspapers were not generally significant.  These surprising findings may have resulted from 
the participant’s expectations.  Participants may have evaluated the bias of the rival 
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newspaper’s article relative to how biased they expected it to be.  When it was not 
overwhelmingly biased, their surprise may have led them to reduce their reported perception 
of bias. 
 Gunther et al. (2009) manipulated the extent to which the stimulus article’s source 
would be expected to support participants’ positions.  In their study, participants were 
recruited who opposed genetic research on wild rice.  This position is largely associated with 
Native American activism, and the participants were all either members of Native American 
tribes or non-tribe members who supported Native American causes.  The source of the 
article was manipulated so that it was either written by a Native American writer for a 
publication that catered to a Native American readership or by a non-native writer for a 
general-interest publication.  The study showed that non-native participants perceived the 
article as more sympathetic to their cause when it was written by a Native American writer, 
while Native American participants were not affected by this source variable.  This finding 
suggests that the relationship between expected source bias and actual perceived biases is 
complex.  However, it supports the finding of other studies that at least some audience 
members will perceive a bias that is consistent with a media outlet’s purported ideology or 
affiliation.  The authors suggested that their activist participants may have generally 
interpreted the stimuli as attitude-consistent simply because the issue of genetic research on 
wild rice is rarely covered in the mass media.  According to this interpretation of the data, the 
participants were pleasantly surprised to see an issue that is so important to them covered by 
the news media, so they were predisposed to interpret this coverage positively. 
 D’Alessio (2003) tested the effects of expectations of bias.  Before exposing them to 
the stimulus article, he told some of his participants that the article was “potentially biased” 
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(p. 286).  This manipulation only increased perceptions of bias when the article was about the 
performance of President George W. Bush.  In fact, there was limited evidence that this 
potential bias cue reduced perceptions of bias when the article dealt with campus parking or 
campus housing.  As with the Arpan and Raney (2003) findings reported above, D’Alessio’s 
finding may have resulted from violated expectations.  The cue that an article might be 
biased may have made participants expect an overwhelming bias.  Even if participants saw 
the article as biased, this bias was more subtle than the participants expected, resulting in 
reduced perceptions of bias. 
 The present study will directly measure the effect of media outlet ideology on 
perceptions of bias.  While some studies, particularly Coe et al. (2008) have offered some 
insight into this effect, these studies have not maintained the level of control that will be 
present in the current study.  Coe et al. (2008) used actual media content from well-known 
media outlets.  As a result, the effects they found could have been due to other factors 
besides the sources’ ideological leanings, such as participants’ existing attitudes toward the 
media outlets or the content of the individual news stories.  The participants may have 
perceived biases because the content really was biased.  The present study will hold content 
constant while only manipulating the media outlet’s stated ideology.  This design will make 
it possible to separate media ideology from other factors. 
 Even though the evidence is somewhat mixed, there is limited evidence that a media 
outlet that expresses an explicit ideological leaning will be perceived as more biased than a 
media outlet that does not express an explicit ideological bias.  The following multi-part 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H2a: Relative to a website with no ideological identification, a website that labels 
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itself “liberal” will elicit greater perceptions of bias from conservative participants 
and lower perceptions of bias from liberal participants. 
H2b: Relative to a website with no ideological identification, a website that labels 
itself “conservative” will elicit greater perceptions of bias from liberal participants 
and lower perceptions of bias from conservative participants. 
H2c: Moderate participants will perceive a website that labels itself “conservative” or 
“liberal” as more biased than a website with no ideological identification. 
Psychological causes of hostile media perceptions.  In their original hostile media 
study, Vallone et al. (1985) offered two possible explanations for this phenomenon, both of 
which were supported by the data.  The cognitive explanation was that partisans have a set of 
assumptions supporting their viewpoints and they perceive bias when news coverage does 
not reflect that set of assumptions.  This explanation is supported by the fact that, among 
partisans, higher levels of knowledge about the Middle East were associated with greater 
perceptions of bias (among neutrals, the opposite was true).  The perceptual explanation is 
that partisans on each side actually “saw” the news coverage differently.  This explanation 
was supported by questions that measured perceptions of the news coverage itself, such as 
the percentages of favorable and unfavorable references to Israel.  Both knowledge of the 
Middle East situation and involvement in the issue correlated with hostile media perceptions.  
It was not possible to determine which variable had more effect, in part because they were 
highly correlated with each other. 
 Subsequent research has suggested a number of psychological explanations for the 
hostile media effect.  Most research has identified three major mechanisms that could 
account for hostile media perceptions (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Schmitt et al., 2004).  
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One is “selective recall” (p. 625), in which people simply remember more counter-attitudinal 
information than pro-attitudinal information from a news story, leading them to erroneously 
believe that the story contained more of the former than the latter.  The second proposed 
mechanism is “selective categorization” (p. 625), in which people on each side of an issue 
remember the same content but actually evaluate the valance of the content differently, with 
each person interpreting the content in a way that supports a perception of counter-attitudinal 
bias.  In other words, people on each side of an issue feel that certain story elements support 
the side opposite to theirs, and this selective characterization causes people to perceive that 
the story contains more counter-attitudinal than pro-attitudinal elements.  These first two 
mechanisms are roughly equivalent to the perceptual explanation offered by Vallone et al. 
(1985).  The third mechanism is the use of “different standards” (p. 626), and it is more 
consistent with the cognitive explanation suggested by Vallone et al. According to this 
explanation, people on each side of the issue remember the same content and interpret its 
valance in the same way, but they have different opinions about which pieces of information 
should have been included in the story.  All of the elements of the story that support the 
audience member’s position, as well as neutral elements, are deemed legitimate but elements 
that do not support the preferred position are deemed to be unacceptable, inaccurate, or 
irrelevant.  In this case, perceived bias is based on a belief that the author of the news story 
went out of his or her way to include irrelevant or inaccurate information in order to sway 
perceptions of the issue.  In the first test of these psychological mechanisms, Giner-Sorolla 
and Chaiken (1994) found limited support for the selective categorization and different 
standards mechanisms, but their research design did not allow for separating the influence of 
the three mechanisms in an unambiguous way.   
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 Schmitt et al. (2004) used the same research design reported by Gunther and Schmitt 
(2004) and measured all three of these mechanisms as possible explanations for the hostile 
media effect.  The selective recall explanation was not supported, as participants on each side 
of the genetically modified foods (GMF) issue recalled the same number of positive and 
negative elements from the stimulus.  The researchers also presented participants with 
specific excerpts from the article they had just read and asked them to categorize these 
excerpts as supporting or opposing GMF.  In support of the selective categorization 
mechanism, participants who opposed GMF were more likely to see the excerpts as 
supporting GMF.  This result was evident when the stimulus was presented as an article from 
USA Today but not when it was presented as a student essay, indicating that this mechanism 
specifically operates in regards to media content.  Although this result was only marginally 
significant after controlling for age and education, it does offer some support for the selective 
categorization explanation.  Finally, participants were also asked to assess the accuracy of the 
excerpts.  Participants were less likely to label an excerpt as accurate when they believed that 
it contradicted their beliefs.  However, this difference was consistent whether the stimulus 
was presented as a newspaper article or a student essay.  This finding indicates that people 
have a general tendency to use different standards when evaluating pro-attitudinal and 
counter-attitudinal information, but the lack of a difference between the newspaper and essay 
conditions suggests that this tendency is not an important mechanism contributing to the 
hostile media effect.  This study supports selective categorization as the psychological 
mechanism underlying the hostile media effect, although the researchers admit that they 
cannot prove that selective categorization leads to perceptions of bias rather than perceptions 
of bias leading to selective categorization.   
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 Overall, current research seems to support selective categorization as the main 
psychological mechanism behind the hostile media effect.  The comparison between the 
selective categorization and different standards mechanisms was replicated using more 
stringent tests by Gunther and Liebhart (2006).  The selective categorization mechanism was 
also supported by Chia, Yong, Wong, and Koh (2007).  While it is possible that other 
psychological mechanisms are at work in the hostile media effect, the case appears to be 
settled that, among the three mechanisms that have been proposed, selective categorization is 
the only one with clear empirical support.  Based on this research, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H3: Perceptions of media bias will be mediated by the extent to which participants 
selectively categorize specific excerpts of the website’s content as favoring the other 
side of the issue. 
Antecedents of the hostile media effect.  The literature is clear that the hostile media 
effect does not occur uniformly for all audience members at all times.  Hostile media 
perceptions seem to depend on a variety of factors related to both the individual audience 
member and the nature of the issue under discussion.  Research has shown that not all issues 
invoke hostile media perceptions to the same extent.  For example, Giner-Sorolla and 
Chaiken (1994) found clear evidence of a hostile media effect for news coverage of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict but the same participants did not show a hostile media effect for 
news coverage of abortion.  It would seem that the hostile media effect is more or less likely 
to occur based on characteristics of the issue under consideration, the individuals viewing the 
content, or a combination of the two.  This section will summarize previous research that has 
identified specific antecedents of the hostile media effect.  These antecedents will all be 
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measured in the present study. 
 In addition to the Middle East conflict (Vallone et al., 1985; Perloff, 1989; Giner-
Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Tsfati & Cohen, 2005; Tsfati, 2007), the hostile media effect has 
been demonstrated in response to news coverage of the war in Iraq (Choi, Watt, & Lynch, 
2006), the conflict between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims (Matheson & Dursun, 2001), 
environmental issues (Christen & Huberty, 2007), physician-assisted suicide (Gunther & 
Christen, 2002), labor disputes (Christen, Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002), radon gas 
(Gunther & Christen, 2002), use of animals in laboratory research (Gunther & Chia, 2001; 
Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001), genetically modified organisms (Gunther & 
Schmitt, 2004; Schmitt et al, 2004; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006), stem cell research (Hwang, 
Pan, & Sun, 2008), government surveillance of citizens (Hwang et al., 2008), social security 
(Hwang et al., 2008), gender issues in academia (Coe et al., 2008), student housing 
(D’Alessio, 2003), plans to build casinos in Singapore (Chia et al., 2007), and South Korea’s 
National Security Law (Choi, Yang, & Wang, 2009).  Hostile media perceptions have also 
been shown for news coverage of specific elections or politicians (Dalton et al, 1998; 
D’Alessio, 2003; Coe et al., 2008; Huge & Glynn, 2010) and social groups, such as political 
parties and ethnic groups (Gunther, 1992).  In contrast, several studies have found limited 
support for a hostile media effect in regards to news coverage of abortion (Giner-Sorolla & 
Chaiken, 1994; Kim & Pasadeos, 2007; cf. Gunther & Lasorsa, 1986).  Gunther and Lasorsa 
(1986) failed to find hostile media perceptions of coverage of hunger in the United States, 
school prayer, and nuclear arms and, as noted above, Gunther et al. (2009) failed to find true 
hostile media perceptions for the issue of genetic research on wild rice. 
 Two issues were chosen for the present study: abortion and government involvement 
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in the national economy.  These issues were chosen because they are salient in contemporary 
political discourse.  Although abortion was not a highly visible issue during the 2008 
presidential campaign, it is always a salient issue for many citizens (see Miller, 2008).  The 
economy has been a particularly salient issue since the global recession that began in late 
2007 (see, e.g., Pew Research Project for the People & the Press, 2010). 
 These issues were also chosen because they would seem to have clear liberal and 
conservative sides. As such, it is possible to predict which direction each media outlet should 
favor if it is biased in the direction of its stated ideology.  The conservative media outlet 
should be expected to show a bias against abortion and in favor of free-market economic 
solutions, while the liberal media outlet should be expected to show the opposing bias.   
Based on the issues that have produced hostile media perceptions in the past, a 
number of possible antecedents are suggested.  These issues are all likely to invoke strong 
attitudes on both sides, which is necessary since, by definition, the hostile media effect only 
comes into play for people who have at least a moderately strong opinion on the issue 
discussed in a news story.  Many of these issues are also associated with strong group 
identifications, as people are likely to associate their opinions on these issues with their 
identities as “Republicans,” “Democrats,” “environmentalists,” “college students,” etc.  
Additionally, people are likely to associate their opinions on these issues with their values or 
morals.  All of these factors could explain why these specific issues seem to lead to hostile 
media perceptions. 
 Strength of opinion is perhaps the most obvious potential antecedent to the hostile 
media effect.  Since people with no opinion on an issue do not show a hostile media effect, 
and people with strong opinions have been shown to demonstrate hostile media effects, it 
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seems plausible that there is a correlation between attitude strength and the strength of 
perceived biases.  Gunther (1988) found a relationship between attitude extremity on an issue 
and trust in newspaper coverage of that issue.  Survey respondents who held somewhat 
strong views (higher or lower than the midpoint but not at either extreme) on the issues of 
abortion, United States policy toward Latin America, and welfare showed higher levels of 
trust in media coverage of those issues than did respondents who had moderate or extreme 
views on those issues.  The author speculated that people with moderate views had little 
incentive to pay close attention to media coverage of these issues, so their trust in that 
coverage was based on a general sense of skepticism toward news media rather than actual 
media content.  People with extreme views on the issues paid attention to media coverage, 
but, as the hostile media hypothesis predicts, they showed low levels of trust because the 
news coverage they saw did not reflect the way they perceived the issue.  Those people 
whose views were somewhat strong paid attention to media coverage but did not see it as 
largely discrepant from their own views, resulting in higher levels of trust in the media 
coverage. 
 Hwang et al. (2007) examined attitude extremity as an antecedent of the hostile media 
effect and found support for this relationship only for the issue of government surveillance of 
American citizens.  They did not find this relationship for the issues of stem cell research or 
social security reform.  Interestingly, Hwang et al. found evidence that ideological extremity 
(operationalized as the average between an individual’s identification with their political 
party and their identification as either a liberal or conservative) was positively related to 
perceptions of media bias for stem cell research and social security reform, but not domestic 
surveillance.  Thus, for all three of the issues they examined, perceptions of media bias were 
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related to either attitude extremity or general ideological extremity, but never to both.  It is 
not immediately clear what differences between these issues would cause this discrepancy, 
but it is clear that attitude and ideological discrepancy influence the hostile media effect only 
for some issues. 
 Another antecedent of the hostile media effect examined in some studies is group 
identification.  Gunther (1992) found that levels of identification with various groups 
(Republicans, Democrats, Catholics, born-again Christians, African-Americans, Hispanics, 
and labor union members) were consistently correlated with perceptions of media bias 
against those groups.  In fact, group identification was the only variable in the analysis that 
consistently predicted perceptions of bias.  General skepticism, skepticism toward media, 
demographic variables, and objective measures of the respondents’ hometown newspapers 
were related to perceptions of bias only in regards to a few of the groups included in the 
study.   
 Other studies have echoed Gunther’s (1992) finding that group identification is an 
antecedent of the hostile media effect.  Matheson and Dursun (2001) found similar results in 
their study of Serbs and Muslims who had recently emigrated to Canada.  Participants’ level 
of identification with their in-groups and the extent to which they perceived differences 
between their groups and out-groups were both positively related to perceptions of bias in 
general media coverage of the Bosnian conflict and perceived bias of news articles supplied 
by the researchers as an experimental stimulus.  Duck et al. (1998) found that higher levels of 
identification with each of Australia’s two major political parties lead to greater perceptions 
of media bias against that party.  Gunther et al. (2009) found similar results for participants 
who felt higher levels of identification with Native American groups that opposed genetic 
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research on wild rice. 
 Eveland and Shah (2003) took a different approach to examining the effect of group 
identification on hostile media perceptions.  Their survey data indicated that strength of party 
identification was one of several variables that predicted perceptions of media bias.  In 
addition, they asked their survey respondents how often they engaged in political discussions 
with people who shared their views and found that this variable was correlated with 
perceptions of media bias.  By contrast, frequency of political discussion in general was not 
related to perceptions of bias.  Interestingly, an interaction was found indicating that this 
relationship was only present for Republicans.  Democrats did not show a relationship 
between like-minded discussion and perceptions of media bias.  These findings suggest that 
Americans who identify strongly with the Republican Party and engage in frequent 
discussions with other Republicans are more likely to believe that news media are biased.  
These relationships may reflect the findings of Domke et al. (1999) that accusations of liberal 
bias made by politicians and pundits convince conservative members of the general public 
that media have a liberal bias.  Interpersonal discussions among conservative Republicans 
reinforce this belief and strengthen the perception of liberal media bias. 
 A third potential antecedent of hostile media perceptions is the extent to which an 
individual’s position on an issue relates to his or her morals or values.  For each of the three 
issues they examined (stem cell research, domestic surveillance, and social security reform), 
Hwang et al. (2007) asked participants how much their positions on those issues were based 
on their core values.  They defined this measure as “value involvement” (p. 85).  The authors 
found a positive relationship between value involvement and perceptions of biased media 
coverage of all three issues.  This relationship was further supported by Choi et al. (2009).  
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This finding suggests that values need to be investigated more thoroughly in research on the 
hostile media effect.  Previous research on political communication has shown that values 
have important effects on the processing of political messages.  For example, people use 
different decision-making strategies for voting decisions involving issues that invoke values 
than those involving issues that do not (Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 1997; Domke, Shah, & 
Wackman, 1998).  Personal values influence attitudes on issues, regardless of how the issue 
is framed by news coverage (Shen & Edwards, 2005).   
 Closely related to the concept of values is the variable of moral conviction, or “a 
strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral” (Skitka, 
Bauman, & Sargis, 2005, p. 896).  Although morals and values are not the same thing 
(Langer & Cohen, 2005), it is plausible that both are relevant to hostile media perceptions.  
Skitka et al. found in both correlational and experimental studies that people tend to want to 
avoid contact with people who disagree with them on opinions that are held with a sense of 
moral conviction.  People showed fewer tendencies to want to avoid contact with people who 
disagreed with them on issues on which they held strong attitudes but no moral mandate.  
Participants who felt a moral mandate on an issue showed an overall tendency to want to 
avoid people with whom they disagreed, but they especially showed a desire to avoid such 
people in their intimate personal relationships.  There was no difference between personal 
and non-personal relationships when no moral mandate was present.  Additionally, 
participants showed less ability to fruitfully discuss an issue on which they felt a moral 
mandate, even though the discussion only required deciding how the issue would be 
resolved, and did not even require expressing their opinions.  The same result was not found 
for issues on which people felt strongly but did not feel a moral mandate.  Additionally, 
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moral mandates were found to be issue-specific.  Although some people show a stronger 
general tendency toward holding attitudes with moral conviction, all respondents felt moral 
mandates on some issues.  The relationship between feeling a moral mandate on an issue and 
wanting to avoid close contact with people who felt differently on that issue was just as 
strong regardless of a respondent’s general tendency to feel moral mandates.  Just as values 
were found by Hwang et al. (2008) to contribute to hostile media perceptions, it is likely that 
moral convictions lead to hostile media perceptions.  Since people generally want to avoid 
contact with people who hold views that contradict their moral convictions, they will 
probably also react negatively toward news content that does not exactly match their moral 
convictions. 
 Another possible antecedent to the hostile media effect is preconceptions of media 
bias.  Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994) found evidence that people were more likely to see 
media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as biased if they entered the experiment 
already believing that media were generally biased.  This relationship was fairly weak and 
only present for some of their dependent variables.  Gunther (1992) found limited support for 
the effect of media skepticism on perceived bias in coverage of social groups.  More recently, 
Hwang et al. (2008) found that general mistrust of media had a positive correlation with 
perceptions of media bias for all three issues they examined.   
An additional possible antecedent is media cynicism.  Political communication 
researchers generally discuss cynicism as a distrust of government and political institutions 
(e.g.  Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2000; Kaid, Postelnicu, Landreville, Yun, & LeGrange, 
2007).  Cynical people are likely to feel a sense of political alienation, as if their interests and 
views are not represented by government (Levi & Stoker, 2000).  This general sense of 
   
34 
 
political alienation could be transferred to media.  If cynical citizens assume that their 
viewpoints are not adequately represented in the halls of government, they may also assume 
that their viewpoints are not going to get fair treatment by reporters.  Consequently, cynical 
citizens may interpret media content as more biased than non-cynical citizens.  Choi et al. 
(2009) supported this assertion in their research, which found that the related variable of 
media skepticism predicted hostile media perceptions.  However, the cynicism variable, as 
traditionally operationalized, specifically measures cynicism toward the government, but 
there is no reason to believe that a cynical view towards the government is necessarily 
correlated with a cynical view toward media. Consequently, this variable will be adapted into 
a measure of media cynicism using a variation of the traditional government cynicism scale.   
Another political variable that could be related to perceptions of bias is political tolerance.  
This variable assesses the extent to which people are willing to allow people with whom they 
disagree to express their opinions without sanction (see Finkel, Sigelman, & Humphries, 
1999, for a review).  People who express low levels of political tolerance could be expected 
to perceive media content as hostile because they have a narrower sense of what is acceptable 
to say in political discourse.  Thus, they may be more likely to selectively categorize content 
from the stimulus articles as biased against their points of view. A number of antecedents 
of the hostile media effect have been identified by previous research, but not many studies 
have compared these antecedents to each other in the same research design.  The present 
study will include all of these factors in the analysis and also test the hostile media effect 
across several issues in order to determine whether different antecedents might be relevant 
for different political issues.  It is possible that some of these antecedents will not be 
significant when they are all analyzed simultaneously, but since they have been supported by 
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past research, this study will proceed under the assumption that these antecedents will be 
found to influence the hostile media effect.  The following multi-part hypothesis is proposed: 
H4a: Attitude extremity will predict perceptions of a website’s bias. 
H4b: Group identification with political party and political ideology will predict 
perceptions of a website’s bias. 
H4c: The extent to which an individual’s position on an issue connects with their 
moral conviction and values will predict perceptions of a website’s bias. 
H4d: Preconceptions of general media bias will predict perceptions of a website’s 
bias.   
H4e: Media cynicism and will predict perceptions of counter-attitudinal bias in the 
stimuli articles. 
H4f: Political tolerance will predict perceptions of counter-attitudinal bias in the stimuli 
articles.The variety of issues that has been addressed in the stimuli used in previous hostile 
media experiments suggests that different antecedents might be relevant to hostile media 
perceptions for different issues.  Unfortunately, no theoretical rationale has been developed 
to explain which antecedents are likely to affect perceptions of media coverage of which 
issues.  The present study offers the possibility of developing at least a preliminary 
theoretical rationale, through the following research question: 
RQ1: Which political issues invoke each of the antecedents cited in Hypothesis 4? 
Consequences of the hostile media effect.  Perceptions of media bias could have 
profound implications for the ways in which citizens use news media to become more 
informed about politics.  Some of these possible consequences have been examined 
empirically while others have only been assumed.  For example, perceptions of bias would be 
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expected to lead to reduced perceived credibility of the news outlet.  However, in some cases 
this relationship is only assumed, with the two variables not even being measured separately 
(e.g. Choi et al., 2006).  Kim and Pasadeos (2007) measured perceived bias and perceived 
credibility separately but did not compare the two variables.  Instead, they treated them both 
as dependent variables, examining how they were influenced by participant attitudes and 
actual article biases.  More research is needed that will examine the relationship between 
perceived bias and perceived credibility more directly. 
 One reason that perceptions of media credibility could be an important consequence 
of the hostile media effect is that people who doubt the credibility of news media may engage 
in selective exposure or avoid keeping up with current affairs at all.  Democracy relies on 
citizens having at least a base level of knowledge about current issues and how politicians 
feel about them.  Ideally, citizens would get this information from either neutral sources or 
from a variety of partisan sources that represents a wide range of viewpoints. 
 Tsfati and Cohen (2005) identified much more serious consequences of reduced 
media credibility (or trust) due to hostile media perceptions.  They surveyed Jewish settlers 
in the Gaza Strip about their perceptions of media coverage of their settlements.  They found 
that perceptions of anti-settlement media bias led to less trust in media, which is consistent 
with the assumptions of other research.  They also found that trust in media was positively 
correlated with trust in democracy, and trust in democracy was negatively correlated with 
willingness to violently resist government attempts to relocate the settlers.  Thus, perceptions 
of media bias indirectly lead to a willingness to violently resist the government.  While this 
effect was indirect and fairly small in magnitude, it is troubling that the hostile media effect 
could have such a potentially destabilizing influence.  Such an extreme destabilizing effect is 
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not likely to occur in fairly stable democracies, but in an already volatile political context like 
the Gaza settlements perceptions of media bias could lead to dangerous results.  Regardless 
of one’s attitude toward the Gaza settlements, it is never encouraging to hear citizens express 
a willingness to violently resist the actions of their democratically elected government.   
 In addition to assessments of media credibility, Coe et al. (2008) found that 
perceptions of media bias can influence perceptions of how interesting and informative a 
program is.  The Daily Show, which both liberal and conservative participants had rated as 
more biased than CNN or Fox News, was seen as less interesting and informative than the 
two cable news stations.  Similarly, conservatives rated Fox News as more interesting than 
liberals, which corresponds to the different perceptions of bias found for liberals and 
conservatives.  These findings indicate that people are more interested in and feel more 
informed by media content that they do not perceive as biased.  The authors note that their 
findings have both positive and negative normative implications.  The fact that liberals and 
conservatives both saw The Daily Show as biased suggests that people can look past their 
own predispositions to identify bias when it is clearly present.  On the other hand, the finding 
that conservatives did not see Fox News as biased suggests that people may overlook actual 
biases when they support their predispositions.  The different findings for The Daily Show 
and Fox News may reflect the format of the programming.  Fox News’s traditional television 
news format might allow conservative viewers to convince themselves that the programming 
is unbiased while The Daily Show’s satirical format does not allow liberals to make the same 
kind of rationalization.  The finding that perceptions of bias affected perceptions of the 
programs’ abilities to inform and interest participants suggests that these implications are 
important, as they are likely to affect news consumption behaviors.     
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 Research by Hwang et al. (2008) found that perceptions of media bias led to “media 
indignation” (p. 83), which they defined as the extent to which participants reported that 
media coverage made them feel contemptuous, angry, disgusted, and resentful.  Interestingly, 
increased media indignation could be positive, as it lead to an increased “willingness to 
engage in discursive activities” (p. 83), ranging from signing a petition to meeting with an 
elected official to discuss the issue.  This finding suggests that hostile media perceptions may 
have normative benefits. 
 Reader and Riffe (2006) identified a possible negative consequence of hostile media 
perceptions, but did not find empirical support for it.  They cited anecdotal evidence that 
people who perceive media bias in a newspaper’s Letters to the Editor section would support 
the idea that editors should refuse to publish letters that take controversial positions.  Such an 
effect would be negative, as it would indicate increased support for media self-censorship.  
However, their survey data showed that this attitude was not widespread.  In fact, people who 
held strong opinions on the issues of gay rights and the war in Iraq showed strong support for 
the publishing of letters on those topics even when the letters opposed their positions.  
Support for publishing these letters was weaker among those with moderate beliefs, but was 
still generally high across all respondents.  These findings are encouraging, as they suggest 
that hostile media perceptions do not necessarily lead to support for media self-censorship. 
 Perhaps the best documented consequence of the hostile media phenomenon is its 
influence on perceptions of public opinion.  A number of studies have investigated this 
possible consequent under the assumption that people either assume that media content 
reflects majority opinion or they assume that media will sway the opinions of others.  As a 
result, people who perceive media as biased against their opinions should expect the general 
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public to also hold an opinion that is counter to their own.  Contrary to this expectation, there 
is considerable evidence that even people who perceive media bias on a particular issue 
believe that public opinion matches their own opinion (Christen et al., 2002).  However, 
more rigorous studies have used structural equation modeling or mediational analysis to 
separate the influences of this general projection effect and the hostile media effect (Gunther 
& Chia, 2001; Gunther et al., 2001; Gunther & Christen, 2002; Choi et al., 2009; cf. Huge & 
Glynn, 2010).  These studies show that there are actually two competing processes taking 
place.  The projection effect leads people to generally assume that the general public agrees 
with them on issues.  However, viewing news content that they perceive as biased causes 
people to shift their estimation of public opinion away from their own opinions.  This latter 
effect is not as strong as the projection effect, so the net result is that people still show a 
tendency to assume that the public agrees with them, but this projection effect is weaker than 
it would have been without the effect of the “biased” media.  Christen and Huberty (2007) 
found mixed evidence that the effect of hostile media perceptions on perceived public 
opinion might be related to the perceived reach of the medium. 
 In some cases, effects of perceived media bias on perceived public opinion can have 
additional consequences.  Tsfati (2007) found that hostile media perceptions can lead to 
social alienation.  As noted above, much research on the hostile media effect has focused on 
perceived bias against social groups.  Members of these groups who believe that the media 
are biased against them may consequently believe that public opinion is biased against them.  
Tsfati found that Arabs living in Israel perceive that the media there are biased against them.  
This perception of bias has a positive correlation with perceptions that Israeli public opinion 
is biased against Arabs, which in turn leads to feelings of social alienation.   
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 The research reviewed in this section suggests a number of possible consequences of 
the hostile media effect.  These consequences include decreased media credibility and trust 
(which may lead to decreased trust in government), perceptions of how interesting and 
informative a news program is, media indignation, and perceptions that public opinion differs 
from your own opinion.  As with the antecedents of the hostile media perception discussed 
above, these consequences have generally been studied in isolation from each other.  The 
present study will examine these potential consequences together in the same research 
design.  The following multi-part hypothesis is proposed: 
H5a: Perceptions of bias will lead to decreased perceptions of a website’s credibility. 
H5b: Perceptions of bias will lead to decreased ratings of how interesting a website 
is. 
H5c: Perceptions of media bias will lead to decreased ratings of how informative a 
website is. 
H5d: Perceptions of bias will lead to greater media indignation, which will lead to 
greater willingness to engage in discursive activities supporting the participant’s 
position. 
H5e: Perceptions of bias will lead to perceptions that public opinion matches the 
media outlet’s bias. 
As with the antecedents of the hostile media effect that were cited above, it is likely 
that the consequences of hostile media perceptions vary by issue.  For this reason, the 
following research question is asked: 
RQ2: Which political issues invoke each of the consequences cited in Hypothesis 5? 
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Summary and Review of Hypotheses 
 While allegations of media bias have become a common element of political 
discourse, empirical research has failed to provide evidence of consistent systematic 
ideological biases.  Of course, many media do contain ideological biases, but research 
indicates that these biases vary across media and contexts.  Research suggests that people 
perceive bias in media content whether it is actually there or not.  The hostile media 
hypothesis says that people with strong feelings about an issue perceive media coverage of 
that issue as biased against their opinions.  A number of psychological mechanisms have 
been suggested to explain the hostile media effect, but the only mechanism that has received 
consistent support is selective categorization.  The hostile media effect does not occur for all 
people and for all issues, and a number of antecedent conditions have been suggested to 
account for the contexts in which this effect is likely to occur.  One important question to 
consider in the current media landscape is how media that profess a specific ideological 
leaning are perceived differently from media that maintain ostensive neutrality.  Finally, a 
number of consequences of the hostile media effect have been identified. 
 Five hypotheses and two research questions have been proposed for examination in 
this study.  As a review, these hypotheses and research questions are the following: 
H1: Participants with a non-neutral attitude on an issue will see media coverage of 
that issue as biased toward the other side. 
H2a: Relative to a website with no ideological identification, a website that labels 
itself “liberal” will elicit greater perceptions of bias from conservative participants 
and lower perceptions of bias from liberal participants. 
H2b: Relative to a website with no ideological identification, a website that labels 
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itself “conservative” will elicit greater perceptions of bias from liberal participants 
and lower perceptions of bias from conservative participants. 
H2c: Moderate participants will perceive a website that labels itself “conservative” or 
“liberal” as more biased than a website with no ideological identification. 
H3: Perceptions of media bias will be mediated by the extent to which participants 
selectively categorize specific excerpts of the media content as favoring the other side 
of the issue. 
H4a: Attitude extremity will predict perceptions of a media outlet’s bias. 
H4b: Group identification with political party and political ideology will predict 
perceptions of a website’s bias. 
H4c: The extent to which an individual’s position on an issue connects with their 
moral conviction and values will predict perceptions of a website’s bias. 
H4d: Preconceptions of general media bias will predict perceptions of a website’s 
bias.   
H4e: Media cynicism and will predict perceptions of counter-attitudinal bias in the 
stimuli articles. 
H4f: Political tolerance will predict perceptions of counter-attitudinal bias in the 
stimuli articles. 
RQ1: Which political issues invoke each of the antecedents cited in Hypothesis 4? 
H5a: Perceptions of bias will lead to decreased perceptions of a website’s credibility. 
H5b: Perceptions of bias will lead to decreased ratings of how interesting a website 
is. 
H5c: Perceptions of media bias will lead to decreased ratings of how informative a 
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website is. 
H5d: Perceptions of bias will lead to greater media indignation, which will lead to 
greater willingness to engage in discursive activities supporting the participant’s 
position. 
H5e: Perceptions of bias will lead to perceptions that public opinion matches the 
media outlet’s bias. 
RQ2: Which political issues invoke each of the consequences cited in Hypothesis 5? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II: Methods 
 This study used an experimental design to test the hypotheses and answer the research 
questions.  All stimuli and questionnaires were administered on computers using the 
Qualtrics online survey software.  After giving informed consent, participants answered 
questions measuring the hypothesized antecedent variables and then viewed news articles on 
two different issues.  They were told that the articles were from a new online news site that 
was being tested.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which 
the purported nature of the website was manipulated.  It was either described as a news 
website designed for college students (the neutral condition), conservative college students 
(the conservative condition), or liberal college students (the liberal condition).  After reading 
each news story participants answered additional questions. 
Participants 
 Participants for this experiment were students and staff at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill and Radford University in Radford, VA.  Data were collected 
between July 2009 and April 2010.  Participants, most of whom were students at the two 
universities, were recruited through flyers posted on the two campuses, classroom visits by 
the researcher, and a campus-wide email. Additionally, a few participants were recruited 
from student organizations that are involved in political issues, such as the Young Democrats 
and College Republicans.  Participants were recruited from these various groups in an 
attempt to ensure that there was significant variance in the participants’ preexisting opinions 
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on the issues addressed by the stimuli.  Previous experimental studies have been most 
successful at identifying hostile media effects when the researchers recruited participants that 
were expected to hold divergent views on the issues under investigation.  Some studies have 
recruited from groups that were specifically involved with the issues discussed by the stimuli 
(e.g.  Schmitt et al., 2004; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Chia et al., 2007) while others have 
simply recruited from politically-involved groups, such as local Republican and Democratic 
committees (Christen & Huberty, 2007).  This study followed the latter approach.  No 
assumption was made that all Republicans, all Democrats, or all students from the subject 
pool would hold identical views on the issues addressed by the stimuli.  The assumption was 
only that recruiting from these three groups would result in a sample that includes 
participants on each side of each issue, as well as participants who are neutral on the issues. 
Stimuli 
 Participants read articles that were purported to be from a fictional online news 
source which was either presented as being conservative, liberal, or neutral.  These articles 
were drawn from mainstream news sources and adapted so that they presented a neutral, 
even-handed view of each issue.  As discussed previously, the two issues discussed in the 
articles were abortion and government involvement in the national economy (see Appendices 
A and B for full text of the stimulus articles.)  The primary reason for using multiple articles 
is to answer Research Question 1, regarding which issues are likely to invoke different 
antecedents to the hostile media effect.  The issues chosen for this study may invoke different 
antecedents.  Both issues should demonstrate the influence of attitude extremity and 
preconceptions about media bias.  By contrast, these issues may differ in the extent to which 
they invoke attitudes held with moral conviction.  Previous research has shown that people 
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tend to feel a sense of moral conviction about their positions on abortion (Skitka et al., 2005).  
People may feel less sense of moral conviction about their position on economic issues. 
 Measures and Data Analysis 
 A number of measures and statistic methods were used to test the hypotheses and 
answer the research questions.   
Hypotheses 1 and 2.  Hypothesis 1 said that participants with a clear opinion in favor 
of one side of an issue would see media coverage of that issue as biased toward the other 
side.  Hypothesis 2 said that a media outlet that was labeled “liberal” would elicit greater 
perceptions of bias from conservative participants and lower perceptions of bias from liberal 
participants.  The hypothesis further said that a media outlet that was labeled “conservative” 
would elicit the opposite effect, while neutral participants would perceive greater bias for 
websites labeled “conservative” or “liberal.” 
 Since both of these hypotheses involve categorical independent variables and 
continuous dependant variables, they were tested together using a series of 3 (website 
ideology: conservative, neutral, liberal) x 3 (participant position: conservative, moderate, 
liberal) Multivariate Analyses of Variance (MANOVA).  The website ideology variable was 
manipulated as previously described, telling participants that the site was designed for 
college students in general, conservative college students, or liberal college students.  This 
information was communicated to participants before they clicked on the link for the article 
with the following statement:  
The link below will take you to a test version of a news website that is designed to 
appeal to (college students/liberal college students/conservative college students). 
Please take a few minutes to read the article carefully, as we are going to ask you to 
evaluate it when you are done. Please note that we are interested in what you think of 
the content of the article. The website itself is still being developed, so its appearance 
is much simpler than it will be in its finished form and all of the links on the page 
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have been deactivated. We just want to know what you think of the content of the 
article, not the design of the website. 
Additionally, the articles themselves were laid out on a web page that was ostensibly part of 
a website called Collegiatenewsservice.com.  This website was subtitled “The Voice of 
Today’s (College Student/Liberal College Student/Conservative College Student).” 
The participant position variable was determined by measurements of participants’ 
positions on each issue discussed in the articles.  This group assignment was made for each 
participant separately for each issue because of the probability that individual participants 
could have different positions on different issues.  For example, a participant who was pro-
life but supported government intervention to solve economic problems would be in the 
conservative group for the abortion issue but the liberal group for the economy issue.   
 Group assignments for the abortion issue were made based on responses to the 
question, “Do you generally support or oppose allowing abortion to remain a legal option in 
the United States?” (adapted from Skitka et al., 2005, p. 907).  Participants answered this 
question on a seven-point scale consisting of the options strongly support, moderately 
support, slightly support, neutral or neither, slightly oppose, moderately oppose, and strongly 
oppose.  Previous research suggests that people who express slight support for a position can 
be classified as nonpartisans, as they are not likely to exhibit hostile media perceptions 
(Christen & Huberty, 2007).  Consequently, those who chose slightly support, neutral or 
neither, or slightly oppose in response to the abortion question were labeled as neutral, those 
who chose strongly support or moderately support were labeled as “pro-choice,” and those 
who chose moderately oppose or strongly oppose were labeled as “pro-life.”  It is important 
to note that this grouping scheme does not assume that everyone who opposes legalized 
abortion is generally conservative or that everyone who supports legalized abortion is 
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generally liberal.  The variable was not intended to reflect participants’ general political 
ideologies.  The variable was only intended to reflect presumed expectations of pro- or 
counter-attitudinal information.  Pro-life participants should have expected a conservative 
news source to support their perspective and a liberal news source to oppose it, and the 
opposite should have been true for pro-choice participants.   
 As with the abortion issue, group assignments for the economy issue were based on 
responses to an interval scale.  The question for the economy issue was, “When it comes to 
fixing economic problems, do you generally think it's better to have more government 
intervention or more freedom for corporations to do as they please in order to make more 
money?”  Participants responded to that question using a seven-point scale anchored by 
Strongly support government intervention and Strongly support freedom for corporations.  
The categorical groups were formed using the same method as was used for the abortion 
issue.   
 It is important to acknowledge that the participant position variables were based on 
participant responses rather than random assignment.  The use of measured independent 
variables in an experimental design presents several challenges.  First, there is a high 
likelihood that the groups will not be of equal size.  This is particularly a problem if the 
groups do not have equal variances along the dependent variable(s).  Although Keppel and 
Wickens (2004) argue that heterogeneity of variance is a problem even when the groups are 
of equivalent size, it is more of a problem when group sizes are not equivalent.  
Consequently, it was very important for the researcher to use tests of homogeneity of 
variance and to be very careful in interpreting the results in cases in which this assumption 
was not met.  Additionally, the researcher used the General Linear Model approach to 
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performing ANOVAs.  This approach (especially using Type III Sum of Squares, the default 
in SPSS) is better equipped to handle different sample sizes than other approaches to 
ANOVA.   
 An additional problem with independent variables that are not based on random 
assignment is that there could be other differences among groups besides the attitudinal 
variables used to make group assignments.  For example, the liberal condition on the abortion 
issue might be disproportionately female.  As a result, any effects that are found for that 
group could be due to gender differences rather than attitudinal differences.  In order to 
account for this possibility, participants were asked for their gender and a 2 analysis was 
used to determine whether there were gender differences across the groups.  When gender 
differences were found, the MANOVA procedure was repeated using gender as an additional 
factor to determine whether there are any gender effects in addition to other effects.  The 
same steps were taken to make sure there were not any differences based on participant’s age 
or year in school (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior, graduate student, or non-student). 
 Any study of the hostile media effect requires making decisions about how to 
operationalize the dependent variable of perceived media bias.  The research cited so far 
indicated that this dependent variable has been conceptualized in a number of ways, but these 
conceptualizations can be reduced to two general categories.  The first can be labeled 
Ddirectional bias.  This category of variables assesses participants’ perceptions that an 
article or media source has a bias supporting one side of an issue or the other.  For example, 
if a stimulus article dealt with the 2008 United States presidential election and the researchers 
asked participants whether the article had a bias in favor of Barack Obama (or in favor of 
John McCain) this question would be assessing directional bias.  The second category of 
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dependent measures that can be used in hostile media research can be labeled “source bias.”  
This group of variables assesses whether participants viewed the article or the media outlet as 
biased, regardless of the direction of that perceived bias.  If a researcher simply asks 
participants, “Does this article seem to be biased?,” that question would represent an attempt 
to measure perceived source bias.   
After reading each article participants were asked questions measuring the dependent 
variables in the study.  The first set of items was used to measure directional bias, or the 
perception that the website was biased in a specific direction.  These measures were drawn 
from previous research on the hostile media effect (especially Vallone et al., 1985).  All 
responses were measured on seven-point scales with appropriate anchors unless otherwise 
noted (e.g., questions that ask for percentages).  Before they were used in any analyses, all of 
these dependent measures were reverse-coded, if necessary, so that a higher value 
represented a perceived liberal bias.  Participants were asked the following questions: 
Did you feel that the article you just read was biased in favor of either (side of the 
abortion issue/government intervention or free market approaches to solving 
economic problems)? (Anchored by “Strongly biased in favor of [the pro-life 
side/government intervention]” and “Strongly biased in favor of [the pro-choice 
side/free market approaches]”) 
This article presented a strong case in favor of (legalized abortion/using government 
intervention to solve economic problems). (Anchored by “Strongly agree” and 
“Strongly disagree”) 
This article presented a strong case (against legalized abortion/in favor of using free 
market approaches to solving economic problems). (Anchored by “Strongly agree” 
and “Strongly disagree”) 
What percentage of the article do you believe supported (legalized abortion/using 
government intervention to solve economic problems)? (Open ended) 
What percentage of the article do you believe (opposed legalized abortion/supported 
using free market approaches to solving economic problems)? (Open ended) 
What percentage of neutral readers do you think would become more supportive of 
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(legalized abortion/using government intervention to solve economic problems) after 
reading this article? (Open ended) 
How would you guess the author of this article feels about (legalized abortion/the best 
way to solve economic problems)? (Anchored by “Strongly [opposes legalized 
abortion/supports government intervention]” and “Strongly supports [legalized 
abortion/free market approaches”) 
How would you guess the editor of this website feels about (legalized abortion/ the 
best way to solve economic problems)? (Anchored by “Strongly [opposes legalized 
abortion/supports government intervention]” and “Strongly supports [legalized 
abortion/free market approaches”) 
 Additionally, participants’ perceptions of the articles’ and website’s non-directional 
source bias were measured using two semantic differential batteries used by Coe et al. 
(2008).  The first set of questions asked participants to rate whether the article was 
fair/unfair, told the whole story/told part of the story, unbiased/biased, complete/incomplete, 
could be trusted/could not be trusted, accurate/inaccurate, represents reality/does not 
represent reality, and factual/false.  A similar semantic differential scale measured 
perceptions of the website, using the anchoring terms unbiased/biased, can be trusted/cannot 
be trusted, competent/incompetent, fair/unfair, believable/not believable, and neutral/favors 
one side.  These measures all used seven-point scales. 
 All of the dependent measures were coded from -3 to 3, with 0 as the midpoint in an 
effort to simplify interpretation of the results.  A factor analysis was performed on the 
dependent measures for each article.  This procedure was undertaken in order to determine 
how many latent variables these measures represented and whether they accurately reflected 
the distinction the researcher made between source bias and directional bias.  A MANOVA 
was performed on the data for each article in order to demonstrate which variables were 
influenced by the independent variables.  Table 1 shows the expected results for the 
directional bias variable.  It is important to remember that higher values represent perceived 
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biases toward the liberal side of each issue and lower values represent perceived biases 
toward the conservative side.  The Neutral Website row shows the traditional hostile media 
effect; it was predicted that liberal participants would perceive the website as conservative 
while conservative participants will perceived the website as liberal and neutral participants 
will perceive little or no bias.  If Hypothesis 1 was correct, a simple main effect should be 
present supporting this relationship. However, if Hypothesis 2 is supported, there should be 
an interaction showing the relationship seen in Table 1.  This interaction would indicate that 
the stated ideology of the website moderates the general tendency to perceive hostile biases 
in media content. 
Hypothesis 3.  Hypothesis 3 predicted that perceptions of media bias would be 
mediated by the extent to which participants selectively categorized specific excerpts of the 
media content as favoring the other side of the issue.  Following the design used by Gunther 
and Liebhart (2006), participants were asked to read short excerpts from each article and then 
asked, on a seven-point scale, how strongly each excerpt supported legalized abortion or 
government intervention.  These answers were recoded as necessary so that support for the 
liberal position was represented by higher values.  These values were tested for reliability to 
see if the three values for each article could be treated as on variable.  
 These measures of perceived excerpt bias were compared with overall perceptions of 
bias for each article.  These comparisons were made using regression analyses with perceived 
excerpt bias as the independent variable(s) and the directional bias variable used to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 as the dependent variable.  This test was run for both articles.  If the 
hypothesis is correct, all of these regression coefficients should be positive and significant. 
The excerpts used from each article are shown in Appendices C and D. 
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Hypothesis 4 and Research Question 1.  Hypothesis 4 predicted that attitude 
extremity, group identification, moral convictions, and general perceptions of media bias 
would predict perceptions of counter-attitudinal media bias.  All of these antecedent variables 
were measured before participants read each online news article.  Attitude extremity was 
measured using the same questions that were initially used to assess attitudes on the three 
issues.  Responses to this measure were converted to a measure of attitude extremity by 
taking the absolute values of responses, so that the original scale of -3 to 3 was converted to a 
scale of 0 (a neutral attitude) to 3 (an extreme attitude). 
 The second antecedent to the hostile media effect included in the analysis was group 
identification.  This variable was measured with self-identified partisan and ideological 
identification.  Many scales have been proposed to measure ideology and partisanship that go 
beyond simple self-report (Knight, 1999; Weisberg, 1999).  However, the variable of interest 
in this study was not whether participants met some objective definition of liberal or 
conservative, but how they identify themselves.  For that reason, participants’ group 
identification was based on a variation of the basic partisan identification variable used by 
National Election Studies over many election cycles (Weisberg, 1999, p. 684).  For partisan 
identification, participants were asked, “Generally speaking, do you consider yourself more 
of a Democrat or a Republican?” and responded on a seven-point scale.  Similarly, in order to 
assess ideological identification, the same question was asked but with “liberal” and 
“conservative” replacing “Democrat” and “Republican,” respectively.  As with the attitude 
extremity measure, these items were converted from a -3 to 3 scale to a 0 to 3 scale, with 0 
representing the neutral position and 3 representing the most extremely held position.  The 
correlation between the party identification and ideological identification measures was 
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calculated in order to see if they could be combined into one variable or if they had to be 
treated as distinct variables. 
 The third antecedent variable included in this study was the extent to which 
participants’ opinions were held with moral conviction.  This variable was assessed with an 
item used by Skitka et al. (2005).  Participants were asked, “How closely is your attitude 
toward (abortion/fixing economic problems) connected to your core moral beliefs and 
convictions?” Another question came from Skitka and Bauman (2008) and asked 
participants, “How closely is your attitude toward (abortion/fixing economic problems) 
connected to your fundamental beliefs about right and wrong?”  Responses to both of these 
questions were measured on a seven-point scale anchored by “Not at all connected” and 
“Very closely connected.”  Additionally, participants were asked three questions used by 
Hwang et al. (2008) and one used by Skitka and Bauman (2008) that required them to 
indicate their level of agreement with each of the following statements on scales anchored by 
“Strongly disagree” and “Strongly agree.”  These questions were the following: 
The arguments for or against (abortion/greater government intervention in economic 
matters) involve the core values that guide my life. 
The values that are most important to me are what determine my stand on 
(abortion/the best way to fix economic problems). 
My position on (abortion/fixing economic problems) is based on the principles central 
to my value system. 
My feelings about (abortion/fixing economic problems) are a reflection of my core 
moral beliefs and convictions. 
These items were tested for reliability in order to see whether they could be averaged to form 
one scale. 
 Finally, preconceptions of general media bias were measured with items adapted from 
several previous studies.  A semantic differential scale was adapted from Hwang et al. (2008) 
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asking for participants’ perceptions of news in general as Fair/Unfair, Biased/Unbiased, 
Accurate/Inaccurate, Doesn’t tell the whole story/Tells the whole story, Cannot be 
trusted/Can be trusted, and Imbalanced/Balanced.  Additionally, two questions were adapted 
from Gunther (1992, p. 154).  Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement 
with the statements “News reporters try to be objective” and “Most media separate fact from 
opinion.” 
 These four antecedent variables were used as independent variables in a multiple 
regression with non-directional source bias as the dependent variable.  The multiple 
regression analysis was designed to show which of these antecedent variables contributed to 
hostile media perceptions for each of the two political issues.  These results offered an 
answer to the first research question.  If some antecedents contribute to hostile media 
perceptions for one issue but not for the other it would be possible to look at the nature of 
those issues and assess what characteristics of issues are likely to be relevant to each of the 
antecedents. 
 In addition, Research Question 2 asked about several political variables that might act 
as additional antecedents to perceived media bias.  Media cynicism was measured using an 
three-item scale adapted from the government cynicism scale used in previous studies, such 
as Kaid et al. (2007).  Participants were asked to express their level of agreement with the 
following statements on seven-point scales: 
One can be confident that journalists will always do the right thing. 
Journalists are more interested in making money than in what the people think. 
One cannot always trust what journalists say. 
 Another possible antecedent variable included in this study was political tolerance, 
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which was measured using a modified version of a scale developed by Sullivan, Piereson, 
and Marcus (1982, reported in Finkel et al, 1999).  The original scale asked participants to 
pick the political group they like the least, with suggestions offered such as the Ku Klux 
Klan, John Birch Society, atheists, socialists, and communists.  The items in the scale then 
ask participants how much freedom members of that group should have to express their 
views freely.  This scale was used differently in this study.  It would be logistically 
challenging using an online survey tool to have participants pick their least-liked group and 
insert that group’s name into each question.  Instead, all questions asked about a group that is 
almost universally disliked, the Ku Klux Klan.  Many other groups would elicit different 
levels of dislike for participants with different political views.  For example, conservative 
participants may have more negative views of socialists than liberal participants do, so 
liberals may score higher on the tolerance scale simply because they do not need to show as 
much tolerance to advocate for freedom of expression for socialists.  However, Reader and 
Riffe (2006) found that participants across the political spectrum had negative views of 
people who advocate for racism or segregation.  Gibson (1992) used this approach and found 
that the results were highly correlated with the least-liked groups approach.  The modified 
version of the scale used the following questions, with agreement recorded on a seven-point 
scale: 
Members of the Ku Klux Klan should be banned from being President of the United 
States. 
Members of the Ku Klux Klan should be allowed to teach in public schools. 
The Ku Klux Klan should be outlawed. 
Members of the Ku Klux Klan should be allowed to make speeches in public places. 
The Ku Klux Klan should have their phones tapped by our government. 
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The Ku Klux Klan should be allowed to hold public rallies in Chapel Hill. 
Hypothesis 5 and Research Question 2.  Hypothesis 5 predicted that perceptions of 
hostile media bias would lead to a number of different consequences.  These consequences 
include decreased perceptions of the news outlet’s credibility, decreased perceptions of how 
interesting a news outlet is, decreased ratings of how informative a news program is, greater 
media indignation (which will lead to greater willingness to engage in discursive activities 
supporting the participant’s position), and increased perceptions that public opinion differs 
from the participant’s position.  All of these variables except the last one should be 
influenced by the source bias variable, since they do not depend on participants perceiving a 
bias in either specific direction.  In contrast, perceptions of public opinion should be 
influenced by directional bias.  Participants’ perception that a media outlet is biased in a 
specific direction should lead them to believe that public opinion will be correlated with that 
bias.  Consequently, this variable was analyzed separately from the other four hypothesized 
consequences. 
The influence of perceived bias on the first four consequences involved one 
independent variable and several dependent variables, so it could not be evaluated using the 
multiple regression technique used for the previous hypothesis.  Instead, the first four parts of 
the hypothesis were tested using a structural equation model with perceived source bias for 
each issue as exogenous variables.  Among other uses, structural equation modeling allows 
researchers “to estimate simultaneously a system of hypothesized relationships” (Stephenson, 
Holbert, & Zimmerman, 2006, p. 160).  If all of the hypotheses were supported then all of the 
paths should have significant regression coefficients.  Ideally, the model should have strong 
overall fit as well, but for hypothesis testing the hypothesized regression coefficients are 
more important.   
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Hypothesis 5e was tested by regressing directional bias on perceived public opinion.  
The various antecedent variables were measured at the very end of the study and used to 
assess perceptions of the website as a whole.  This approach allowed the researcher to 
determine how much influence perceived bias for each issue had on each outcome variable.   
 The first consequence investigated was credibility.  Previous research on the hostile 
media effect has not directly measured the credibility of specific media outlets, and research 
on credibility in general has failed to result in a consistent method of measurement (Choi et 
al., 2006).  This study measured credibility based on participants’ level of agreement with the 
statement “I believe this website is a credible news source” and a semantic differential scale 
anchored by credible/not credible. 
 The second consequence under study was interest in the media outlet.  This variable 
was adapted from Coe et al. (2008) and used a semantic differential scale anchored by not 
concerned/concerned and interested/not interested.  The third consequence, perceptions of 
how informative the news outlet was, also came from Coe et al.  Participants were asked to 
respond, using a seven-point scale, to the questions, “How informative were the articles on 
the website” and “How informed do you feel as a result of having read the story?” 
 The fourth consequence variable in this study was media indignation.  The measures 
were adapted from Hwang et al. (2008).  This measure asked participants how often media 
(in general) make them feel contemptuous, angry, disgusted, and resentful.  Participants 
respond to each question on a seven-point scale anchored with “Rarely” and “Very often.”  
Media indignation was also hypothesized to lead to willingness to engage in discursive 
activities.  Again following Hwang et al., this variable was measured by asking participants 
how willing they would be to advocate for their position on each issue by (a) signing a 
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petition, (b) attending a public forum, (c) posting their opinion on a website, (d) meeting with 
an elected official, (e) volunteering, (f) looking for more information on the issue, (g) talking 
about the issue with people who have a different view, (h) talking about the issue with people 
who share their view.  All of these questions were answered on seven-point scales anchored 
by “Not willing” and “Extremely willing.” 
 All of these measures were tested for reliability as necessary.  Structural equation 
modeling software was used to test the influence of perceptions of media bias on these four 
consequences for each of the issues.   
Finally, perceptions of public opinion were measured using items from previous 
studies (Christen et al., 2002; Gunter & Chia, 2001; Gunther et al., 2001; Gunther & 
Christen, 2002).  These questions were the following: 
On average, do you believe most Americans (generally support or oppose allowing 
abortion to remain a legal option in the United States/prefer government intervention 
or free market approaches to solving economic problems)? (Anchored by 
“Overwhelmingly [support legalized abortion/conservative]” and “Overwhelmingly 
[oppose legalized abortion/liberal]”) 
 What percentage of Americans would you estimate support (keeping abortion legal 
in the United States/government intervention to solve economic problems)? (Open 
ended) 
On average, do you believe most Americans consider themselves to be (pro-life or 
pro-choice/more conservative or liberal on economic issues)? (Anchored by 
“Overwhelmingly [pro-life/conservative]” and “Overwhelmingly [pro-
choice/liberal]”) 
 These three items were tested to see if they constituted a reliable measure of 
perceived public opinion.  Then a simple linear regression was run using perceived 
directional bias as the independent variable and perceived public opinion as the dependent 
variable.  In addition to testing each part of Hypothesis 5, comparing the structural equation 
analysis and the simple linear regression between the two issues allowed the researcher to 
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answer Research Question 2, concerning which issues were likely to lead to each of the 
hypothesized consequences. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III: Results 
A total of 167 subjects participated in this study, with 93 coming from the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and 74 from Radford University.  Of this sample, 53 
participants were male and 114 were female. The participants’ average age was 21.66 (SD = 
4.617).  The sample was slightly liberal on the abortion issue. For the question, “Do you 
generally support or oppose allowing abortion to remain a legal option in the United States?,” 
the average response was 0.96 (SD = 2.165) on a seven-point scale coded so that “Strongly 
oppose” equaled -3 and “Strongly support” equaled 3.  This mean response differed 
significantly from the midpoint of the scale (t(166) = 5.756, p < .001).  When participants’ 
attitudes toward abortion were used to put them into pro-life, pro-choice, and neutral groups, 
it was shown that attitudes on abortion were consistent across genders (χ2(2) = 2.385, p = 
.303), class in school (χ2(8) = 5.453, p = .708), and university (χ2(2) = 3.162, p = .206). 
By contrast, the participants were fairly moderate on the economic issue. For the 
question, “When it comes to fixing economic problems, do you generally think it's better to 
have more government intervention or more freedom for corporations to do as they please in 
order to make more money?,” the average response was 0.82 (SD = 1.719) on a seven-point 
scale with “Strongly support government intervention” as -3 and “Strongly support freedom 
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for corporations” as 3.  This average did not differ significantly from the midpoint of the 
scale (t(167) = -1.350, p = .179).  When participants’ economic attitudes were reduced to a 
categorical variable, they did not differ based on class in school (χ2(8) = 13.058, p = .110), 
but there were significant differences based on gender (χ2(2) = 8.774, p = .012) and 
university (χ2(2) = 7.736, p = .021).  Specifically, female participants were more likely to 
characterize themselves as supportive of government intervention in the economy (34 
females, as opposed to 16 males) or moderate (61 females, 18 males), while 19 participants 
of each gender identified themselves as economic conservatives.  This gender difference was 
evidently a product of converting the attitude variable to a categorical variable, as the 
original continuous variable’s mean did not differ significantly for male and female 
participants (t(119.19) = .564, p = .574, equal variance not assumed).   
Meanwhile, 36 participants at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
identified themselves as economic liberals while only 14 participants at Radford University 
identified themselves that way.  Roughly the same number of participants at each university 
identified themselves as economic moderates (39 at UNC, 40 at Radford) and economic 
conservatives (18 at UNC, 20 at Radford). The difference between the students at the two 
universities was statistically significant (χ2(2) = 7.736, p = .021).  The difference based on 
university was also statistically significant when compared based on the continuous variable, 
with Radford students showing more support for free market economic policies (M = 4.24, 
SD = 1.662) than UNC students (M = 3.48, SD = 1.698, t(165) = -2.898, p = .004).  since the 
experimental method employed in this study dictates using the categorical variable, all 
analysis of responses to the economic article will be interpreted cautiously, with every 
attempt made to separate the influence of participants’ attitudes from possible effects of their 
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gender or university affiliation.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants with a clear opinion in favor of one side of an 
issue will see media coverage of that issue as biased toward the other side.  Hypothesis 2 
predicted that, relative to a media outlet with no ideological identification, a media outlet that 
is labeled “liberal” will elicit greater perceptions of bias from conservative participants and 
lower perceptions of bias from liberal participants and that the opposite pattern would be 
demonstrated for a website labeled “conservative.”  For each article, a MANOVA was 
performed in order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, as described in Chapter 2. 
Results for the abortion article.  An exploratory factor analysis of the items used to 
measure participants’ perceptions of the abortion article’s bias was conducted.  This analysis 
suggested that the semantic differential items that were designed to assess non-directional 
source bias constituted a strong factor (eigenvalue = 8.872, % variance explained = 40.326).  
These fourteen items formed a highly reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .951).  These items were 
averaged into a new variable, hereafter referred to as source bias.  
A second factor (eigenvalue = 3.603, % variance explained = 16.378) included the 
items “Did you feel that the article you just read was biased in favor of either side of the 
abortion issue?,” “What percentage of this article do you believe supported legalized 
abortion?,” “What percentage of the article do you believe supported abolishing legalized 
abortion?,” “How would you guess the author of this article feels about legalized abortion?,” 
and “How would you guess the editor of this website feels about legalized abortion?”  These 
items also formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .856).1 The items making up this second 
                                                          
1 All percentage items were converted to a scale of -3 to 3 by dividing the values by 14.285714 and subtracting 
3 in order to simplify comparisons with other variables. 
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factor were averaged into a new variable, hereafter referred to as directional bias, since these 
items all measure specific perceptions of pro-abortion rights bias rather than just general, 
non-directional bias. 
A third factor (eigenvalue = 1.601, % variance explained = 7.279) included the items 
“This article presented a strong case in favor of legalized abortion,” “This article presented a 
strong case against legalized abortion,” and “What percentage of readers do you believe 
would become more supportive of legalized abortion after reading this article?”  Of course, 
all of these items were included with the intention that they would be part of the directional 
bias scale, but their lack of reliability with that scale meant that they had to be treated 
separately.  However, these items did not form a reliable scale with each other (Cronbach’s α 
= -.050),2 so they were treated as separate variables for this analysis.   
The overall MANOVA showed that the dependent variables were affected by the 
stated ideology of the website (Pillai’s Trace = 0.222, F(10, 306) = 3.827, p < .001; Wilks’ λ 
= 0.786, F(10, 304) = 3.896, p < .001), the participant’s attitude toward abortion (Pillai’s 
Trace = 0.177, F(10, 306) = 2.972, p = .001; Wilks’ λ = 0.828, F(10, 304) = 3.008, p = .001), 
and the interaction between the two independent variables (Pillai’s Trace = 0.213, F(20, 620) 
= 1.745, p = .023; Willks’ λ = 0.799, F(20, 505.08) = 1.768, p = .021).  The following 
sections will discuss the specific differences observed for each dependent variable included 
in the analysis. 
Results for the source bias variable.  The means for the source bias variable are 
shown in Table 2.  A Levene’s test showed that the variance of this variable did not differ 
                                                          
2 Counter to expectations, the items “This article presented a strong case in favor of legalized abortion” and 
“This article presented a strong case against legalized abortion” were positively correlated (although the 
correlation was not statistically significant).  As a result, when the second item was reverse-coded, the resulting 
correlation was negative, making the overall reliability measure negative as well. 
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significantly between groups (F(8, 156) = 1.318, p = .238), indicating that the results for this 
variable were not invalidated by differences in variance.  Source bias was not directly 
affected the website’s stated ideology (F(2, 165) = 2.933, p = .056) but was affected by the 
participant’s attitude toward abortion (F(2, 165) = 4.816, p < .01) and the interaction between 
the two variables (F(4, 165) = 2.430, p = .050).  A post hoc Tukey’s honestly significant 
difference (HSD) test showed that, regardless of website condition, pro-life and pro-choice 
participants differed on this dependent variable (p < .04), while neither the pro-life group (p 
= .994) nor the pro-choice group (p = .081) differed significantly from the neutral group.  
However, the overall effect of ostensible website ideology was not considered meaningful in 
light of the interaction between the independent variables. 
In order to determine the nature of the interaction between the independent variables, 
a series of one-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were performed. In order to reduce the 
likelihood of Type 1 error, modified criteria for establishing statistical significance were 
employed.  The criteria were determined based on the False Discovery Rate (FDR) procedure 
outlined by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).  This procedure allows concurrent tests to be 
run with progressively larger critical p-values. Once concurrent tests are run, the test with the 
lowest p-values is tested against a very low critical p-value. If this test is found to be 
statistically significant, the other tests are compared to progressively larger p-values. The 
critical p-value is determined using the formula pi = .05i/q, where q is the number of 
concurrent tests being run (in this case, 3) and i is number of the test (in this case, 1 for the 
test with the lowest p-value, 2 for the test with the second lowest p-value, and 3 for the test 
with the largest p-value).  Using this formula, in order for each of three concurrent ANOVAs 
to be deemed statistically significant, the lowest p-value must be less than .017 (or (.05*1)/3), 
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the second lowest p-value must be less than .033 (or (.05*2)/3), and the highest p-value must 
be lower than .05 (or (.05*3)/3). 
First, a one-way ANOVA was run on the participants in each treatment group to test 
whether, within each group, the participants’ attitudes toward abortion influenced their 
perceptions of source bias.  The FDR procedure indicated that participant’s attitude had no 
effects on perceptions of source bias within each condition.  The F-values did not reach the 
modified critical p-values of the FDR procedure for participants who saw the ostensibly 
liberal website (F(2, 53) = 3.862, p = .027), the ostensibly conservative website (F(2, 53) = 
3.877, p = .27), or the ostensibly neutral website (F(2, 52) = 1.776, p = .494).   
Secondly, a one-way ANOVA was run on participants in each attitudinal group to test 
whether the website treatment influenced the source bias variable within the pro-life, pro-
choice, and neutral groups.  The website’s stated bias influenced the dependent variable for 
neutral participants (F(2, 26) = 6.231, p = .006), but not for pro-life (F(2, 35) = 1.667, p = 
.203) or pro-choice participants (F(2, 97) = .497, p = .610).  Within the neutral group, the 
ostensibly neutral website was perceived as less biased than the ostensibly conservative 
website (p = .007) and the ostensibly liberal website (p = .034). The ostensibly liberal and 
ostensibly conservative websites were not perceived differently (p = .426). 
In summary, participants who identified themselves as neutral on the abortion issue 
perceived the websites that were labeled as “liberal” or “conservative” as being more biased 
than an unlabeled website after reading the abortion article. Participants who identified as 
pro-life or pro-choice did not perceive a difference in the source bias based on the ostensible 
ideology of the website. Although the initial analysis suggested a difference in perceived 
source bias between pro-choice and pro-life participants, this overall effect was not strong 
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enough to meet the more rigorous FDR criteria used when analyzing the results in light of the 
observed interaction between the two independent variables.  These results did not support 
Hypothesis 1, since there was no evidence that pro-life or pro-choice participants perceived 
the article as more biased than neutral participants did.  Similarly, there was no support for 
Hypotheses 2a or 2b, since the website’s stated ideology did not affect perceptions of bias for 
pro-life or pro-choice participants. However, Hypothesis 2c was supported, as neutral 
participants perceived the website as more biased when it was labeled as “conservative” or 
“liberal” than when it lacked an ideological label. 
Results for the directional bias variable. Table 3 shows the means within each group 
for the directional bias variable.  All directional items were coded such that a higher value 
indicates support for abortion rights.  Levene’s test showed that the variance of this variable 
was consistent among the groups (F(8, 156) = 0.601, p = .776).  This variable did not show a 
main effect for the participant’s attitude toward abortion (F(2, 156) = 1.676, p = .191), but it 
did show a main effect for the website’s stated ideology (F(2, 156) = 15.567, p < .001) and 
an effect for the interaction between the two independent variables (F(4, 156) = 3.021, p = 
.016).  A post hoc Tukey HSD test showed that, regardless of the participants’ attitudes 
toward abortion, the ostensibly conservative website was perceived as less supportive of 
abortion rights than the ostensibly neutral website (p < .001) or the ostensibly liberal website 
(p < .002).  Perceptions of the liberal and neutral website did not differ (p = .761).  However, 
the overall effect of ostensible website ideology was not considered meaningful in light of 
the interaction between the independent variables. 
In order to determine the nature of the interaction, first, a one-way ANOVA was run 
on participants in each treatment group to test whether, within each group, the participants’ 
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attitudes toward abortion influence their perceptions of directional bias.  The FDR procedure 
indicated that participant’s attitude had no effects on the directional bias within each 
condition.  The F-values did not reach the modified critical p-values of the FDR procedure 
for participants who saw the ostensibly conservative website (F(2, 53) = 3.948, p = .025), the 
ostensibly liberal website (F(2, 53) = 1.404, p = .255), or the ostensibly neutral website (F(2, 
53) = .715, p = .494).   
Secondly, a one-way ANOVA was run on participants in each attitudinal group to test 
whether the website treatment influenced the directional bias variable within the pro-life, 
pro-choice, and neutral groups.  The website’s stated bias influenced the dependent variable 
for pro-life (F(2, 35) = 7.675, p = .002) and moderate participants (F(2, 26) = 6.413, p = 
.005), but not for pro-choice participants (F(2, 97) = 2.056, p = .134).  Within each of the 
former two groups, the ostensibly conservative website was perceived as less biased toward 
the pro-choice position than the ostensibly neutral website (p = .004 for pro-life participants; 
p = .013 for neutral participants) and the ostensibly liberal website (p = .006 for pro-life 
participants; p = .006 for neutral participants). Neither group perceived the ostensibly neutral 
website differently from the ostensibly liberal website (p = .992 for pro-life participants; p = 
.997 for neutral participants).  
In summary, the independent variables influenced the directional bias variable such 
that participants who held pro-life or neutral positions on abortion perceived the ostensibly 
conservative website to be less supportive of abortion rights than the ostensibly liberal 
website. The ostensible ideology of the website did not affect pro-choice participant’s 
perceptions of bias. Thus, the overall effect of website ideology observed in the initial 
analysis proved to apply only to pro-life and neutral participants.  These findings do not 
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support Hypothesis 1, as the participants’ attitudes toward abortion had no direct influence on 
perceptions of pro-abortion bias.  The data also did not support Hypothesis 2a, as pro-life 
participants did not perceive the pro-abortion bias differently based on the website’s 
ostensible ideology.  However, Hypotheses 2b and 2c were supported in that pro-choice and 
neutral participants perceived the website as having less of a pro-abortion bias when it was 
labeled “conservative” than when it was labeled “liberal” or not labeled at all. 
Results for the article’s perceived case in support of abortion rights.  Table 4 shows 
the mean responses to the Likert-type item “This article presented a strong case in favor of 
legalized abortion,” coded so that a value of -3 indicates “Strongly disagree” and a value of 3 
indicates “Strongly agree.”  Levene’s test showed that this variable did not vary consistently 
among the groups (F(8, 156) = 3.140, p = .003).  Since the assumption of homogeneity of 
variances was not met for this variable, the results should be interpreted cautiously, 
especially considering the unequal sizes of the groups in this study.  Temporarily putting 
aside the problem with the variances, this single-item variable appeared to be influenced by 
the website’s stated ideology (F(2, 156) = 4.694, p = .010), participants’ attitudes on abortion 
(F(2, 156) = 3.381, p = .037), and the interaction between the two independent variables 
(F(4, 156) = 4.354, p = .002). However, the post hoc Tukey HSD test did not find any 
significant contrasts among the treatment groups (p-values ranged from .567 to .977) or 
among the attitude groups (p-values ranged from .258 to .991), indicating that the relevant 
differences would emerge only in analysis of the interaction. 
As with the previous two dependent variables, a one-way ANOVA was run on the 
participants in each treatment group to test whether, within each group, the participants’ 
attitudes toward abortion influence their perceptions of the article’s case in favor of legalized 
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abortion.  The FDR procedure indicated that participant’s attitude affected this variable for 
participants who viewed the ostensibly conservative website (F(2, 53) = 14.100, p < .001), 
but not for participants who viewed the neutral website (F(2, 52) = .921, p = .404) or the 
ostensibly liberal website (F(2, 52) = .333, p = .718). A post hoc Tukey’s HSD test showed 
that, among those participants who viewed the ostensibly conservative website, the article 
was perceived as offering significantly less support for abortion rights by neutral participants 
as compared to pro-life (p = .011) or pro-choice (p < .001) participants. There was no 
difference between pro-life and pro-choice participants (p = .069). 
Secondly, a one-way ANOVA was run on participants in each attitudinal group to test 
whether the website treatment influenced the perception that the article made a strong case in 
favor of legalized abortion within the pro-life, pro-choice, and neutral groups.  The website’s 
stated bias influenced the dependent variable for neutral participants (F(2, 26) = 6.697, p = 
.005), but not for pro-life (F(2, 35) = 1.217, p = .308) or pro-choice participants (F(2, 96) = 
1.281, p = .282).  Neutral participants perceived the ostensibly liberal website as making a 
stronger case in favor of legalized abortion than the ostensibly conservative website (p = 
.003).  Perceptions of the ostensibly neutral website did not differ significantly with either the 
ostensibly conservative website (p = .079) or the ostensibly liberal website (p = .366). 
In summary, neutral participants perceived the ostensibly conservative website as 
making less of a case in support of abortion rights than pro-life or pro-choice participants did, 
and neutral participants also perceived the ostensibly conservative website as making less of 
a case in support of abortion rights than the liberal website.  As with the previous two 
dependent variables, these results do not support Hypothesis 1, as there was no direct 
influence of the participants’ attitudes toward abortion on this variable.  These results did 
   
71 
 
offer some support for Hypothesis 2c, as neutral participants were much less likely to 
perceive the article as having a pro-abortion bias when it appeared on an ostensibly 
conservative website than when it appeared on an ostensibly neutral or liberal website.  As 
noted before, however, this variable did not have a consistent variance among the 
experimental conditions, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the findings.  Also, this variable 
was based on a single item, meaning that its reliability is impossible to determine.  Despite 
these limitations, the findings for this variable was essentially consistent with the findings for 
the first two dependent variables, lending some additional support to the findings reported for 
those variables. 
Results for the article’s perceived case in opposition to abortion rights.  Table 5 
shows the mean responses to the Likert-type item “This article presented a strong case 
against legalized abortion,” with a value of -3 indicating “Strongly disagree” and a value of 3 
indicating “Strongly agree.”  Levene’s test indicated that the variances within the groups 
were sufficiently homogeneous for this variable (F(8, 156) = 3.140, p = .083).  This single-
item variable was influenced by the website’s stated ideology (F(2, 156) = 5.096, p = .007), 
but not the participants’ attitudes on abortion (F(2, 156) = 3.035, p = .051) or the interaction 
between the two independent variables (F(4, 156) = .925, p = .451). The post hoc Tukey’s 
HSD test showed that, regardless of their attitudes toward abortion, participants viewed the 
ostensibly neutral website as making less of a case against legalized abortion than the 
ostensibly conservative version of the website (p = .029). On this variable, there was no 
perceived difference between the liberal website and the neutral website (p = .316) or the 
conservative website (p = .501). 
 Again, this variable does not support Hypothesis 1, as there was no difference in the 
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perceived case against abortion rights based on participants’ attitudes toward abortion.  There 
was, however, support for the prediction that the article would be perceived as presenting 
more of a case against legalized abortion when presented on an ostensibly conservative 
website than when presented on a neutral website, although this effect was not exactly 
consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 2, since this perception was not tied to 
participant attitudes.  Also, as with the previous variable, this variable was based on a single 
item and is, therefore, of unknown reliability. 
Results for perceived effect on public opinion.  The final dependent variable 
included in the MANOVA was the percentage of readers that participants believed would be 
swayed to support abortion rights as a result of reading this article.  This variable was not 
affected by the stated ideology of the website, the participants’ attitudes on abortion, or the 
interaction between the two variables.  Notably, participants across all conditions tended to 
offer very low percentages in response to this item, with a few outliers offering much larger 
percentages, resulting in an unacceptably skewed distribution. Unlike the other dependent 
variables, this variable’s distribution did not approximate normality, meaning that the results 
would be suspect even if significant differences had been found among the groups.  
Consequently, neither Hypothesis 1 nor Hypothesis 2 was supported in regards to this 
variable. 
Summary of results for the abortion article.  The results for the abortion article did 
not support Hypothesis 1, as the participants’ attitudes toward abortion did not affect their 
perceptions of the article’s bias.  For this particular article, the basic hostile media effect was 
not supported.  However, the results offered support for the various parts of Hypothesis 2.  
When the dependent variable was general (non-directional) bias, neutral participants 
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perceived an ostensibly liberal or conservative website as more biased than an unlabeled 
website.  When the dependent variable was directional bias (in support of abortion rights), 
pro-life and neutral participants perceived the ostensibly conservative website as being less 
supportive of abortion rights.  The results for two of the single-item variables also supported 
the general conclusion that the website’s ostensible ideology, rather than the participants’ 
attitudes, influenced perceptions of bias, although questions about reliability and 
homogeneity of variance suggest that the specific results for the single-item variables should 
not be taken as conclusive. 
Results for the economy article.  An exploratory factor analysis of the items used to 
measure participants’ perceptions of the economy article’s bias was conducted.  The results 
of the factor analysis were substantively similar to the results of the factor analysis conducted 
on the results for the abortion article.  This analysis suggested that the semantic differential 
items intended to measure source bias constituted a strong factor (eigenvalue = 9.041, % 
variance explained = 41.095).  These fourteen items formed a highly reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .949).  Just as for the abortion article, these items were averaged into a new 
variable, hereafter referred to as “source bias.” 
A second factor (eigenvalue = 3.376, % variance explained = 15.345) included the 
items “Did you feel that the article you just read was biased in favor of either government 
intervention or free market approaches to solving economic problems?,” “What percentage of 
this article do you believe supported using government intervention to solve economic 
problems?,” “What percentage of the article do you believe supported using free market 
approaches to solving economic problems?,” “How would you guess the author of this article 
feels about the best way to solve economic problems?,” “How would you guess the editor of 
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this website feels about the best way to solve economic problems?,” and “This article 
presented a strong case in favor of using government intervention to solve economic 
problems.”  These were most of the items that were supposed to measure directional bias, 
and they formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .868).3 The items making up this second 
factor were averaged into a new variable, hereafter referred to as “directional bias.”  
A third factor (eigenvalue = 1.604, % variance explained = 7.289) did not have any 
components that loaded on it better than on other factors. Of the two remaining items, “What 
percentage of readers do you believe would become more supportive of using government 
intervention to solve economic problems after reading this article?” loaded best on a fourth 
factor (eigenvalue = 1.291, % variance explained = 5.870) and the item “This article 
presented a strong case in favor of using free market approaches to solve economic 
problems” loaded best on a fifth factor (eigenvalue = 1.091, % variance explained = 4.959).  
Consequently, these two items were treated as single item measures for the MANOVA. 
The overall MANOVA using participant attitude and website condition as the 
independent variables showed that the dependent variables were affected by the participant’s 
attitude toward the economy (Pillai’s Trace = 0.115, F(8, 308) = 2.346, p = .018; Wilks’ λ = 
0.885, F(8, 306) = 2.405, p = .016), but not the stated ideology of the website (Pillai’s Trace 
= 0.085, F(8, 308) = 1.702, p = .097; Wilks’ λ = 0.916, F(8, 306) = 1.705, p = .097) or the 
interaction between the two independent variables (Pillai’s Trace = 0.134, F(16, 624) = 
1.351, p = .160; Willks’ λ = 0.872, F(16, 468.06) = 1.345, p = .165).   
As noted above, there was a statistically significant gender difference, such that 
female participants were more likely to identify as economic liberals than male participants 
                                                          
3 All directional items were coded such that a higher value indicates perceived bias in support of free market 
economic policies. 
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were.  Consequently, an additional MANOVA was run with gender as a third independent 
variable in order to determine if the dependent variables were influenced by participant 
gender.  The results show that there was no main effect for gender (Pillai’s Trace = 0.038, 
F(4, 144) = 1.405, p = .235; Wilks’ λ = 0.962, F(4, 144) = 1.405, p = .235). There was also no 
effect for the interaction between gender and experimental condition (Pillai’s Trace = 0.016, 
F(8, 290) = 0.300, p = .966), the interaction between gender and economic attitudes (Pillai’s 
Trace = 0.051, F(8, 290) = 0.954, p = .472; Wilks λ = 0.949, F(8, 288) = 0.950, p = .476), or 
the three-way interaction among the variables (Pillai’s Trace = 0.086, F(16, 588) = 0.808, p 
= .678).  These results indicate that participant gender did not influence the dependent 
variables, suggesting that the observed differences were the result of the participants’ 
attitudes toward the economy, independent of their genders. 
Since the initial MANOVA showed no influence of the experimental condition (or the 
interaction between the independent variables) it is safe to say that, for the economy article, 
none of the three parts of Hypothesis 2 were supported, as the website’s ostensible ideology 
had no influence on participants’ perceptions of bias.  However, Hypothesis 1 was supported 
for some of the dependent variables.  No effect of participant attitude was found for the 
source bias variable (F(2, 156) = 0.136, p = .873; Levene’s test: F(8, 156) = 0.547, p = .820).  
This variable’s means are shown in Table 7.  Similarly, no effect was found for the single-
item variable based on participants’ agreement with the statement, “This article presented a 
strong case in favor of using free market approaches to solving economic problems” (F(2, 
156) = 0.136, p = .873).  This variable’s means are shown in Table 8.  Levene’s test indicated 
that this variable was not distributed homogeneously across cells (F(8, 156) = 2.804, p = 
.006), suggesting that even if a significant difference was found the inconsistent variances 
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would make the finding somewhat problematic.  Table 8 shows the means for this variable.   
Table 9 shows the means for the directional bias variable.  This variable was affected 
by the participant’s attitude on economic issues (F(2, 156) = 4.489, p = .013).  Levene’s test 
showed that this variable had homogeneous distributions within each cell (F(8, 156) = 0.388, 
p = .926).  Specifically, participants who supported liberal economic policies were more 
likely to perceive the article as supporting free market economic policies than neutral 
participants were (p = .029).  Participants who supported conservative economic policies did 
not differ from those who support liberal policies (p = .990) or those who are neutral on 
economic issues (p = .067).  This finding supports the prediction that liberal participants 
would perceive a conservative bias, although it does not support the prediction that 
conservative participants would perceive a liberal bias. 
 Table 10 shows the mean values for participant’s responses to the item “What 
percentage of readers do you believe would become more supportive of using government 
intervention to solve economic problems after reading this article?” (with values standardized 
to a scale of -4 to 3).  This variable was affected by participants’ attitudes on economic issues 
(F(2, 156) = 4.285, p = .015).  As with the directional bias variable, participants who 
supported liberal economic policies were more likely to perceive a bias than were neutral 
participants (p = .020).  There was no difference between conservative and liberal 
participants (p = .909), nor was there a difference between conservative and neutral 
participants (p = .100).  However, these results are somewhat suspect as, according to 
Levene’s test, the variables did not have a homogeneous variance among the different groups 
(F(8, 156) = 4.204, p < .001).   
 In summary, the results for the economy article offered some support for Hypothesis 
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1 by showing that economic liberals were more likely to see the economy article as biased, 
although this result was not consistent across all of the dependent variables.  No support was 
found for Hypothesis 2 in regards to the economy article. 
Hypothesis 3 
 The third hypothesis predicted that perceptions of media bias would be mediated by 
the extent to which participants selectively categorize specific excerpts of the media content 
as favoring the other side of the issue.  This hypothesis was designed to test the selective 
categorization mechanism supported by previous research, which suggests that the hostile 
media effect occurs because people interpret specific pieces of information from news stories 
as biased.  This proposed mechanism is distinct from other possible explanations for the 
hostile media effect that have not been supported by previous research, such as the selective 
recall mechanism.  This hypothesis was tested by having participants evaluate three excerpts 
from each article in order to access whether they perceived these excerpts as biased to the 
same extent that they perceived the overall articles as biased.   
Although the original plan was to average responses for the three excerpts from each 
article, these responses demonstrated only a moderate level of reliability (Cronbach’s α = 
.534 for the excerpts from the abortion article; Cronbach’s α = .432 for the excerpts from the 
economy article).  Since these responses did not seem to constitute an acceptably reliable 
scale, the responses for each excerpt were treated as separate independent variables for the 
regression analyses used to test Hypothesis 3.  The dependent variable for each of these 
analyses was the directional bias variable identified by the factor analyses discussed in the 
results for Hypotheses 1 and 2.  This variable was chosen because it conceptually matched 
the question used to access perceptions of each excerpts’ bias, “This excerpt supports 
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(legalized abortion/using government intervention to solve economic problems),” which is 
directional in nature. 
 For the abortion article, participants were more likely to perceive Excerpt 1 as 
supporting abortion rights (M = 0.37 on a -3 to 3 scale, SD = 1.503) than Excerpt 2 (M = 
0.16, SD = 1.206) or Excerpt 3 (M = -0.93, SD = 1.560; see Appendix C for the text of the 
excerpts).  A series of paired-sample t-tests showed that Excerpt 3 was perceived as 
significantly less supportive of abortion rights than Excerpt 2 (t(163) = 8.207, p < .001) or 
Excerpt 1 (t(163) = 8.397, p < .001), but there was no significant difference between 
perceptions of Excerpts 1 and 2 (t(163) = 1.664, p = .098).  A multiple regression analysis 
using all three independent variables showed that, taken together, these variables explained 
70% of the variance in the dependent variable.  However, the multiple regression analysis 
showed that the response to Excerpt 1 predicted the dependent variable (Standardized β = 
.249, p = .003), but responses to Excerpt 2 (Standardized β = -.002, p = .979) and Excerpt 3 
(Standardized β = .059, p = .464) did not.   
 For the economy article, Excerpt 1 was seen as the most supportive of government 
intervention (M = 0.63, SD = 1.491), followed by Excerpt 3 (M = -0.32, SD = 1.358) and 
Excerpt 2 (M = -1.05, SD = 1.476; see Appendix 4 for the text of the excerpts).  A series of 
paired-sample t-tests indicated that all of these differences were statistically significant, with 
Excerpt 1 perceived as more supportive of government intervention than Excerpt 2 (t(165) = 
10.443, p < .001) or Excerpt 3(t(165) = 6.788, p < .001) and Excerpt 3 perceived as more 
supportive of government intervention than Excerpt 2 (t(165) = -6.075, p < .001).  A 
regression analysis showed that these three variables accounted for 22.9% of the variance in 
the directional bias variable.  Specifically, the dependent variable was significantly affected 
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by the first (Standardized β = -.306, p < .001) and third excerpts (Standardized β = -.277, p < 
.001), but not the second excerpt (Standardized β = -.076, p = .315). 
 Overall, these results offer limited support for Hypothesis 3.  Participants’ 
perceptions of the articles’ biases corresponded to perceptions of bias for one of the abortion 
excerpts and two of the economy excerpts.  This finding lends support to the selective 
categorization mechanism’s role in the hostile media effect. 
Hypothesis 4 and Research Question 1 
 Hypothesis 4 predicted that attitude extremity, ideological group identification, 
connection between the participant’s attitude and his or her moral values, general perceptions 
of media bias, political cynicism, and political tolerance would influence participants’ 
perceptions of the articles’ biases.  Research Question 1 asked whether these antecedents 
would differently predict perceptions of bias for each issue.  The source bias variable 
identified in the earlier factor analyses was used as the dependent variable to test this 
hypothesis.  This variable was used because the hypothesis speaks to general perceptions of 
bias rather than a specific directional bias.  Regression analyses were conducted using the 
source bias variables for each article as the dependent variables.   
 The extremity of the participants’ party identification and ideological identification 
were found to be significantly correlated (r = .557, p < .001).  Although the magnitude of the 
correlation was only moderate, the fact that the correlation was clearly significant indicates 
that it is strong enough to average the items into one variable for the purposes of this 
analysis.  The items used to assess general perceptions of media bias were found to form a 
reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .874) and were, therefore, combined into one variable.  The 
items used to measure political tolerance also constituted a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 
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.824) and were combined.  The items used to measure media cynicism formed a scale that 
was not as reliable as the others (Cronbach’s α = .555).  However, this reliability was 
deemed acceptable for the present analysis because the measures used closely parallel 
measures that have been used in previous studies of political cynicism.   Consequently, the 
items were combined.  Additionally, the items used to assess the connection between 
attitudes and moral values formed reliable scales for abortion (Cronbach’s α = .890) and the 
economy (Cronbach’s α = .864). 
 A regression analysis was performed using perceptions of source bias for the abortion 
article as the dependent variable and the six predicted antecedents from Hypothesis 4 as 
independent variables.  These six variables accounted for 18.4% of the variance in the 
dependent variable.  Only the participants’ general perception of media bias was a significant 
predictor of the dependent variable (Standardized β = .372, p < .001).  Attitude extremity 
(Standardized β = -.140, p = .072), group identification (Standardized β = .094, p = .215), the 
connection between attitudes toward abortion and moral values (Standardized β = -.030, p = 
.689), political tolerance (Standardized β = .104, p = 154), and media cynicism (Standardized 
β = .001, p = .989) failed to predict the dependent variable.  Thus, for the abortion article, 
Hypothesis 4d was supported but the other parts of Hypothesis 4 were not. 
 A comparable regression analysis was run for the economy article, and it was found 
that the six hypothesized antecedents of perceived media bias accounted for only 5.4% of the 
variance in the source bias variable.  As with the abortion article, general perception of 
media bias predicted the dependent variable (Standardized β = .159, p = .045), while attitude 
extremity (Standardized β = .017, p = .835), connection with values (Standardized β = -.086, 
p = .274), group identification (Standardized β = -.023, p = .771), political tolerance 
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(Standardized β = .116, p = .146), and media cynicism (Standardized β = .122, p = .172) did 
not predict the dependent variable.  Thus, the results for the economy article were the same 
as for the abortion article: General perceptions of media bias functioned as an antecedent of 
perceived bias for the stimulus articles, but none of the other hypothesized antecedents were 
found to predict the dependent variables. 
 In summary, Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c, 4e, and 4e were not supported for either article, 
but Hypothesis 4d was supported for both articles.  The answer to Research Question 1 is that 
the one antecedent that affected perceptions of article bias did so for both the abortion issue 
and the economy issue.   
Hypothesis 5 and Research Question 2 
The fifth hypothesis predicted that perceived media bias would lead to decreased 
perceptions of the media outlet’s credibility, ratings of how interesting a news outlet is, 
decreased ratings of how informative a news program is, greater media indignation (which 
would, in turn, lead to greater willingness to engage in discursive activities supporting the 
participant’s position), and perceptions that public opinion differs from the participant’s 
position.  Research Question 2 asked which political issues would invoke these 
consequences. 
All of the hypothesized consequences except perceptions of public opinion were 
hypothesized to be linked to general (non-directional) perceptions of bias.  In other words, 
they should be influenced by the perceptions that the website is biased, regardless of which 
position the website is perceived as favoring.  In contrast, the public opinion variable should 
be tied to perceived directional bias; for example, participants who perceived the abortion 
article as biased in favor of the pro-life position should be more likely to estimate that the 
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public generally supports the pro-life position.  As such, Hypotheses 5a through 5d were 
tested using a structural equation model with the source bias variable as the lone exogenous 
variable and the hypothesized consequences as endogenous variables.  A simplified version 
of this hypothesized model (showing just the latent variables) is shown in Figure 1.  
Hypothesis 5e was tested by calculating the correlation between the directional bias variable 
and perceived public opinion on each issue. 
Since the AMOS structural equation modeling software requires that there be no 
missing data, linear interpolation was used to estimate values for a handful of cases that were 
missing a response for a given item.  The very low number of missing values suggested that 
they were the result of random oversight on the part of the participants rather than any kind 
of systematic non-response that might bias the results.  No item was missing values for more 
than two cases and no individual participant was missing a value for more than two items 
used in any of the models discussed in this section (very few participants were missing more 
than one value).  The seemingly random nature of the missing data suggested that linear 
interpolation was a simple but effective way to assign values to those cases so as to allow the 
analysis to proceed without having to delete cases.   
Among the 14 items used to measure source bias, a total of seven values had to be 
interpolated for the abortion article and 11 values had to be interpolated for the economy 
article.  Three values had to be interpolated for the website credibility variable (a four-item 
scale), three for the interestingness variable (a five-item scale), one for the variable 
measuring how informative the website was perceived as being (a three-item scale), four for 
willingness to engage in discursive activity on the abortion issue (an eight-item scale), five 
for willingness to engage in discursive activity on the economy issue (an eight-item scale), 
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and one for the media indignation variable (a four-item scale).  
 Results for the abortion article.  All observed variables showed strong relationships 
with their respective latent variables (all Standardized βs > .500, all ps < .001).  Perceptions 
of the abortion article’s bias led to decreased perceptions of the website’s credibility 
(Standardized β = -.442, p < .001) and decreased perceptions of how informative the website 
is (Standardized β = -.233, p = .011).  Perceptions of bias did not, however, influence 
perceptions of how interesting the website is (Standardized β = -.133, p = .107) or media 
indignation (Standardized β = .136, p = .117), and media indignation did not influence the 
participants’ willingness to engage in discursive action on the abortion issues (Standardized β 
= -.024, p = .788).  These results supported Hypotheses 5a and 5c but not Hypotheses 5b and 
5d.  The initial model did not fit the data particularly well (χ2(577) = 1044.2, p < .001; GFI = 
.766; CFI = .898; NFI = .802; TLI = .875; RMSEA = .070, Standardized RMR = 1.077).  
Once interestingness, media indignation, and willingness to engage in discursive 
activity were removed from the model, perceived bias still influenced perceived credibility 
(Standardized β = -.435, p < .001) and perceptions of how informative the website was 
(Standardized β = -.228, p = .012).  The new model showed much better fit (χ2(104) = 197.5, 
p < .001; GFI = .907; CFI = .969; NFI = .938; TLI = .936; RMSEA = .074, Standardized 
RMR = 0.084).  The modification indices for this model suggested that the model fit would 
be improved by adding a regression line showing that the perception of how informative the 
website was influenced the website’s perceived credibility.  When this relationship was 
added to the model it was found to be significant (Standardized β = .375, p < .001) and the 
influence of perceived bias on credibility (Standardized β = -.348, p < .001) and how 
informative the website was (Standardized β = -.218, p = .015) remained significant.  Adding 
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the relationship between the two endogenous variables further increased model fit (χ2(103) = 
173.9, p < .001; GFI = .915; CFI = .976; NFI = .945; TLI = .951; RMSEA = .064, 
Standardized RMR = 0.058).  The modified model, excluding the observed indicator 
variables, is shown in Figure 2. 
In order to test Hypothesis 5e, a simple linear regression was run with directional 
bias and the participants’ attitudes toward abortion as independent variables and perceived 
public opinion on the abortion issue as the dependent variable.  If Hypothesis 5e is correct, 
the article’s perceived support for abortion rights should lead to perceived public support for 
abortion rights, even when the participants’ own attitudes are included in the model.  The 
three items used to measure perceived public opinion formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α 
= .767).  The regression analysis showed that participants who perceived the article as having 
a pro-choice bias were also more likely to believe that the public was more pro-choice 
(Standardized β = .188, p = .016).  However, perceptions of public opinion were not 
influenced by participants’ own attitudes toward abortion (Standardized β = .023, p = .770).  
Thus, the result did not lend support to the finding of much previous research that people 
tend to estimate that the public agrees with their attitudes.  However, more to the point of the 
present study, participants’ perception of the article’s bias did influence their perception of 
public opinion, so Hypothesis 5e was supported for the abortion article. 
Results for the economy article.  All observed variables showed strong relationships 
with their respective latent variables (all standardized βs > .500, all ps < .001).  Perceptions 
of the economy article’s bias led to decreased perceptions of the website’s credibility 
(Standardized β = -.755, p < .001), decreased perceptions of how informative the website is 
(Standardized β = -.351, p < .001), and decreased perceptions of how interesting the website 
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is (Standardized β = -.386, p < .001).  Perceptions of bias did not influence media indignation 
(Standardized β = -.062, p = .467), but media indignation did influence the participants’ 
willingness to engage in discursive action on the economy issue (Standardized β = .292, p = 
.001).  Again, the initial model did not fit the data particularly well (χ2(577) = 1276.6, p < 
.001; GFI = .720; CFI = .859; NFI = .775; TLI = .828; RMSEA = .085, Standardized RMR = 
0.122).   
Since they were not affected by the exogenous variable, media indignation and 
willingness to engage in discursive activity were removed from the model.  Perceived bias 
still influenced perceived credibility (Standardized β = -.753, p < .001), perceptions of how 
informative the website was (Standardized β = -.349, p < .001), and perceived interestingness 
(Standardized β = -.384, p < .001).  The new model showed slightly better fit based on most 
fit criteria (χ2(213) = 585.0, p < .001; GFI = .797; CFI = .899; NFI = .854; TLI = .846; 
RMSEA = 0.108, Standardized RMR = .084), but the improvement was not drastic.   
The modification indices for this model suggested that the model fit would be 
improved by adding regression lines showing that the perception of how interesting the 
website was influenced perceptions of how credible and informative the website was.  When 
these relationships were added to the model it was found that interestingness did, in fact, 
influence credibility (Standardized β = .208, p = .002) and perceptions of how informative 
the website was (Standardized β = .331, p < .001).  Meanwhile, perceived bias still 
influenced credibility (Standardized β = -.645, p < .001), how informative the website was 
perceived as being (Standardized β = -.212, p = .012), and how interesting the website was 
perceived as being (Standardized β = -.375, p < .001).  Adding the two relationships among 
the endogenous variables further increased model fit (χ2(211) = 562.4, p < .001; GFI = .806; 
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CFI = .905; NFI = .860; TLI = .853; RMSEA = .100, Standardized RMR = 0.100).   
Although the model still did not display an ideal level of fit, the modification indices 
provided by AMOS did not offer any suggestions that would increase our understanding of 
the relationships among the variable.  For example, model fit could have been improved by 
adding correlations among the error terms for the observed variables, but since there was no 
practical reason to add correlations among the error terms, such a modification would 
artificially increase model fit.  Additionally, the lack of fit was deemed to be a minor 
problem, since structural equation modeling was used in this case to test the influence of 
perceived bias on various hypothesized consequences, and this goal was adequately 
achieved.  The modified model, excluding the observed indicator variables, is shown in 
Figure 3. 
In order to test Hypothesis 5e, a simple linear regression was run with directional 
bias and the participants’ attitudes toward the economy as independent variables and 
perceived public opinion on the economy issue as the dependent variable.  The three items 
used to measure perceived public opinion did not form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 
.479).  This lack of reliability occurred because the item “On average, do you believe most 
Americans consider themselves to be more conservative or liberal on economic issues?” was 
not highly correlated with the items “On average, do you believe most Americans prefer 
government intervention or free market approaches to solving economic problems” (r = .173, 
p < .05) or “What percentage of Americans would you estimate support government 
intervention to solve economic problems?” (r = .132, p > .05).  Consequently, only the latter 
two items were combined to form the dependent variable.  These two items were fairly well 
correlated with each other (r = .425, p < .001).  The regression analysis showed that 
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participants’ perceptions of public opinion on the economic issue was not affected by the 
participants’ attitudes (Standardized β = .133, p = .087) or their perceptions of the article’s 
bias (Standardized β = -.035, p = .649).  Unlike with the abortion article, Hypothesis 5e was 
not supported.  As with the abortion article, the results also did not lend support to the 
finding of much previous research that people tend to estimate that the public agrees with 
their attitudes.   
Summary of results for Hypothesis 5 and Research Question 2.  Overall, the 
answer to Research Question 2 is that two of the hypothesized consequences were present for 
both issues, one was present only for the abortion issue, one only for the economy issue, and 
one for neither issue.  Hypotheses 5a and 5c were supported for both articles, as participants’ 
perceptions of both article’s biases led them to perceive the website as less credible and 
informative.  Hypothesis 5b was only supported in the context of the economy article, as 
perceptions of that article’s bias led participants to see the website as less interesting.  
Hypothesis 5d was not supported for either article.  Hypothesis 5e was supported for the 
abortion issue but not for the economy issue. 
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV: Discussion 
 The results of this study offered support for some of the hypotheses but also offered 
some surprises and suggested some issues to be addressed by future research.  At its most 
basic level, this study was designed to test how a media outlet’s stated ideology would affect 
perceptions of its bias.  Research on the hostile media phenomenon suggests the people who 
have strong attitudes on an issue will perceive coverage of that issue as biased against their 
attitudes, but that research has typically used stimuli that were ostensibly objective.  This 
study sought to examine how media outlets that stated a particular ideological bias upfront 
would be perceived. 
 The results for the abortion article and the results for the economy article were not 
consistent with each other.  For the abortion article, participants who perceived the article as 
biased did so based on the website’s ostensible ideology.  The classical hostile media effect 
was not evident for this article.  By contrast, the results for the economy article were more 
consistent with the hostile media effect, as participants who supported liberal economic 
policies perceived the article as biased in favor of conservative economic policies, regardless 
of whether the website was presented as being liberal, conservative, or neutral.   
The difference in how the two articles were perceived is not entirely surprising in 
light of previous research.  As noted in the literature review, research has shown mixed 
results when articles about abortion are used as stimuli in studies of the hostile media 
phenomenon.  While previous studies have not shown such a striking absence of a hostile 
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media effect in response to abortion articles, any hostile media effect shown in these studies 
has been less pronounced than in studies of the hostile media effect using other issues in their 
stimulus articles.  Several factors might account for the lack of a clear hostile media effect 
for the abortion issue seen in this study and elsewhere.   
One possibility was suggested by Gunther et al. (2009) in their study of hostile media 
perceptions of articles about genetic research on wild rice.  Their results did not match the 
traditional hostile media hypothesis, as participants generally found the stimulus articles to 
be favorable to their attitudes.  The authors speculated that their participants, most of whom 
were highly involved with the issue, may have been influenced by the fact that the issue 
under question is very rarely covered in the mass media.  The participants may have been so 
pleasantly surprised to see news coverage of this under-covered issue that they were 
predisposed to evaluate the coverage positively.  While abortion certainly receives more 
media coverage than wild rice does, studies of agenda setting show that abortion does not 
tend to be one of the top issues covered in American media coverage of politics (see, e.g., 
Tedesco, 2005).  Perhaps pro-life and pro-choice participants in the present study were 
simply excited to see the abortion issue receiving coverage on a website geared toward 
college students.  By contrast, the economy is consistently shown in agenda setting research 
to receive a great deal of coverage from the mainstream media, so the same level of 
excitement would not have been present when participants read the economy article.   
However, while it may have some merits, the totality of the research on the hostile 
media effect casts doubt on this interpretation.  While abortion may not receive as much 
media coverage as wars or the economy, it almost certainly receives more coverage than 
some of the other issues that have been used in hostile media research, such as genetically 
   
90 
 
modified foods or physician-assisted suicide, both of which have been shown to invoke 
hostile media responses in previous studies.  Being pleasantly surprised to see coverage of an 
issue that is important to you could plausibly mitigate a hostile media reaction that might 
otherwise occur, but, based on the existing research, this mechanism does not seem likely to 
offer a full explanation for why certain issues do not invoke a hostile media perception. 
Another possibility is that the issues of abortion and the economy differ in how 
clearly the terms “liberal” and “conservative” apply to them.  These issues were chosen for 
this study because they appeared to have clear-cut ideological positions.  Presumably, a 
media outlet that is labeled as “conservative” should be expected to support the pro-life 
position on abortion and free market economic positions, while a media outlet labeled 
“liberal” should support the pro-choice position on abortion and interventionist economic 
positions.  However, it is possible that the association between issue positions and ideologies 
was clearer to the participants in regards to the abortion issue than it was in regards to the 
economy issue.  The words “conservative” and “liberal” might have triggered very clear 
associations with the pro-life and pro-choice positions on abortion without triggering such 
clear associations with economic positions.   
If this explanation is accurate, it suggests interesting implications relevant to the 
questions investigated by this study.  Specifically, this interpretation suggests that ideological 
media may, indeed, be perceived differently than the classical hostile media effect would 
predict.  It is plausible that participants who were told that the website was either liberal or 
conservative used that information to interpret each article’s bias to the extent that is was 
convenient to do so.  When reading the abortion article, the website’s ostensible ideological 
identification served as a useful cue for interpreting the article’s bias.  Since the abortion 
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article itself did not display an overwhelming bias for or against legalized abortion, 
participants may have simply assumed that a conservative website would have a pro-life bias 
and a liberal website a pro-choice bias.  If the ideological continuum was not as clear for 
economic issues, then participants would not have been able to use this cue in interpreting 
that article’s bias.  If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that ideological labeling on 
media essentially overrides the traditional hostile media effect, but only when there is an 
obvious position that a given ideological media outlet should be expected to take. 
To illustrate, suppose a pro-life, free-market supporting conservative stumbles on to 
an article about abortion on a news website with which she or he is not familiar, and suppose 
the article itself does not have a clear bias for or against legalized abortion.  In isolation, the 
hostile media effect would predict that this individual would perceive this article as having a 
pro-choice bias.  However, suppose the news website has a heading identifying it as a 
conservative website.  The findings of this study suggest that the “conservative” label will 
override the hostile media effect because the website will be assumed to oppose abortion 
rights.  However, if the same situation played out and the article focused on the economy, the 
hypothetical web surfer might not be as clear on the website’s assumed bias.  A 
“conservative” website could conceivably represent any of a number of perspectives on the 
economy, ranging from an extreme anti-government libertarianism to a populist support for a 
welfare state.  Since the ideological labeling provides an ambiguous cue, the traditional 
hostile media effect kicks in, and the reader interprets the article as having a counter-
attitudinal, anti-free market bias. 
This interpretation complicates the hostile media effect.  Since many contemporary 
media outlets do not shy away from expressing an ideological point of view, researchers 
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must recognize that audience members will react to explicitly ideological media differently 
from ostensibly objective media, but this difference is complex.  Intuitively, researchers may 
expect conservatives’ hostile media perception to essentially disappear when watching Fox 
News or listening to Rush Limbaugh’s radio show and for the same thing to happen when 
liberals watch MSNBC or read the Huffington Post.  However, the results of this study 
suggest that this “shut down” of the hostile media phenomenon is not likely to happen except 
in cases in which the audience member has a clear sense of where a given media outlet stands 
on the particular issue under discussion.  This understanding of a given media outlet’s 
expected bias is likely to be highly variable based on individual interpretations of terms like 
“conservative” and “liberal” and familiarity with the media outlet.  For example, someone 
who watches Fox News frequently is likely to have a pretty clear sense of where the station’s 
various commentators stand on many different issues, but someone watching for the first 
time might not have much of a framework for interpreting potential biases, even if he or she 
knows that the network is usually considered to fit within the broad category of 
“conservative.”  The findings of this study suggest that the former person, who is familiar 
with the idiosyncratic biases of the journalists and commentators, will interpret their work as 
matching those biases, while the latter individual will be more likely to interpret potential 
biases as being counter-attitudinal, as predicted by the hostile media effect.   
While this interpretation of the study’s results has interesting implications for 
understanding audience responses in the current media landscape, more research is needed to 
determine whether it accurately reflects the way in which the participants interpreted the 
stimuli.  One way to test this interpretation would be to design a study in which the 
ambiguity of the source’s ideological leaning is manipulated.  For example, the portion of 
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this study using the article about the economy could be replicated with an additional 
condition in which the website is described either in straight ideological terms (“liberal” 
versus “conservative”) or in terms that are more specific to the economy issue (such as “a 
website that promotes free-market policies” versus “a website that promotes economic 
regulation”).  Such a study would allow for comparisons between participants who have only 
the website’s general ideology to use as a cue to participants who have more specific 
information.  If the explanation offered here is correct, participants with more specific 
information should perceive the stimulus as being biased in a way that is consistent with that 
information, regardless of their own attitudes on economic policy. 
Another issue raised by these findings is the relationship between the hostile media 
phenomenon and the concept of involvement.  As noted in the literature review, previous 
research shows that the hostile media phenomenon applies to people who have strong 
attitudes on the issue being covered.  Although the hostile media effect applies to presumably 
objective news coverage rather than persuasive messages, recent research (Choi et al., 2009) 
suggests that the phenomenon can be better understood by borrowing the concept of 
involvement from research on persuasion, especially the often-cited elaboration likelihood 
model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).  Choi et al. showed that the more involved participants 
were with the issue covered in the stimulus, the more likely they were to perceive the media 
content as hostile.  While many researchers (particularly Albert Gunther and his colleagues) 
have acknowledged the role of involvement by recruiting participants that they expected 
would be highly involved with the issues under investigation, Choi et al. actually used 
involvement as a predictor variable and found that it had a linear relationship with 
perceptions of hostile media bias.  Future research needs to investigate this relationship 
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further. 
However, it is important to note that research on the role of involvement in the hostile 
media effect cannot simply import the hostile media effect’s theoretical perspective into the 
elaboration likelihood research paradigm.  In addition to the obvious differences between the 
types of stimuli used in these two research traditions (persuasive messages for the elaboration 
likelihood model versus balanced journalistic reporting for the hostile media effect), it 
appears that the conception of involvement that is relevant to each of these theories is 
different.  According to Choi et al., the type of involvement that is studied in persuasion 
research can be described as “outcome-relevant involvement” (2009, p. 61), as it is based on 
how the issue’s possible outcomes could affect the audience member.  For example, in many 
persuasion studies, student participants are asked to read stimulus essays arguing for the 
implementation of senior comprehensive examinations as a graduation requirement.  In these 
studies, involvement is typically manipulated by telling the participants either that the 
decision to implement the exams will affect them (the exam requirement could be 
implemented by their university before they graduate) or that it will not affect them (it will 
not be implemented before they graduate or it is only being considered by other universities).   
By contrast, Choi et al. argue that the hostile media effect is dependent on “value-
relevant involvement,” (2009, p. 61), defined as how likely participants are to “consider is 
the issue in terms of their personal values” (p. 70).  Their research confirmed that value-
relevant involvement and outcome-relevant involvement were separate concepts and that 
only value-relevant involvement influenced the hostile media effect.  These findings suggest 
implications for the line of research represented in the present study.  It is conceivable that 
participants’ level of value-relevant involvement with an issue will influence whether they 
   
95 
 
evaluate potential biases of coverage of that issue on their own attitudes or on a media 
outlet’s stated ideology.  Similar to what has been found by persuasion researchers, it is 
possible that highly involved individuals may focus on the content itself (perhaps invoking 
the classic hostile media effect) while less involved individuals might rely on heuristics such 
as the website’s stated ideology (which may function as a sort of peripheral cue).  The 
possibility that there could be a sort of dual-process model of perceived media bias should be 
investigated by future research. 
While it makes intuitive sense to speculate that involvement would lead people to 
ignore ideological labels and base their interpretations on an article’s bias on the content 
itself, the data collected for this study actually suggest that the effect of value-relevant 
involvement could be more complex.  Value-relevant involvement, as defined by Choi et al. 
(2009), is conceptually very similar to the variable of moral conviction that was hypothesized 
to predict perceptions of media bias in this study.  As noted in the previous chapter, this 
moral conviction variable did not predict perceptions of either article’s bias.  This finding 
contradicts the findings of Choi et al., although this difference may simply be a function of 
how the variables were operationalized.   
However, even if moral conviction had been a significant predictor of perceived 
media bias, this variable suggests a different pattern of influence for the value-relevant 
involvement variable.  A post hoc paired-sample t-test showed that the participants felt a 
stronger sense of moral conviction in regard to their positions on abortion (M = 4.87) than 
their positions on the economy (M = 4.37, t(166) = 4.098, p < .001).  This difference is not 
surprising, as abortion would seem to be an issue that invokes moral conviction more than 
the economy does.  But in light of the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2, this difference suggests 
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that value-relevant involvement may not function the way that outcome-relevant involvement 
functions in persuasion.  For the participants in the present study, abortion attitudes were held 
with more moral conviction (which, presumably, meant they felt more value-relevant 
involvement) than the economy issue, yet it was the abortion issue that led to perceptions of 
bias based on the website’s stated ideology rather than the hostile media effect.  The 
website’s ideology would seem to be a sort of peripheral cue, yet it affected the participants 
when they were reading articles about the issue with which they were more involved.  These 
results suggest that much more research needs to be done before it will be clear how 
involvement affects perceptions of media bias. 
Attitude extremity does not seem to account for the differences between the two 
articles any more than the moral conviction variable does.  In the literature review, the author 
speculated that people were more likely to perceive counter-attitudinal biases for issues on 
which they held very strong attitudes.  However, attitude strength did not contribute to 
perceptions of bias for either article in this study.  Furthermore, the participants showed more 
polarization for the abortion issue (less than 20% were in the neutral category) that for the 
economy issue (close to half of the participants were in the neutral category).  If polarization 
led to hostile media perceptions, we would expect to see more evidence of the hostile media 
phenomenon for the abortion article than for the economy article, yet the results were just the 
opposite.   
The same conclusion applies to group identification, which was hypothesized to 
influence perceptions of bias but did not do so for either article in this study.  The fact that 
group identification, along with the other hypothesized antecedents of perceived bias (except 
pre-existing perceptions of general media bias) did not end up predicting the dependent 
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variables suggests that these variables only predict the hostile media effect when they are 
directly relevant to the issue covered by the stimulus articles.  For example, group 
identification has been found to affect the hostile media phenomenon when the articles in 
question actually cover the groups that participants identify with (Gunther, 1992; Duck et al., 
1998) or a conflict involving those groups (Matheson & Dursun, 2001).  In the only study 
that found general support for group identification (Eveland & Shah, 2003), this effect was 
only found for Republican participants.  This dissertation suggests that variables such as 
group identification should not be assumed to influence hostile media perceptions all the 
time, but only when they are relevant to the issues being studied.  This study indicates that 
abortion and the economy are not issues for which general partisan group identification is 
relevant, although the results might have been different if the researcher had measured group 
identification in a more specific way, such as the extent to which participants identified with 
pro-life or pro-choice groups. 
Another question about the hostile media effect suggested by this study is the extent 
to which different media can be expected to invoke hostile media responses.  As noted in the 
literature review, previous research has shown mixed results in regards to whether a media 
outlet with a greater reach invokes more of a hostile media response than one with less reach 
(Gunter et al., 2009; Huge & Glynn, 2010).  However, these studies examined reach by 
comparing local newspapers (low reach) with national newspapers (high reach).  Participants 
should certainly be aware that a national newspaper will have a greater reach than a local 
newspaper, but they should also recognize both as traditional media outlets.  Indeed, virtually 
all research on the hostile media effect has used stimuli that were ostensibly drawn from 
traditional media outlets such as newspapers or television news.   
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The fact that the participants in this study did not display a hostile media effect for the 
abortion article and only displayed limited support for the hostile media effect for the 
economy article suggests that new media such as websites might not fit the participants’ 
definition of “media” closely enough to invoke a clear-cut hostile media effect.  This study 
grew out of an interest in how the hostile media effect would apply to new media that were 
more explicitly ideological than old media, but future research is needed in order to examine 
what other aspects of new media might complicate traditional understandings of the hostile 
media effect.  For example, the media landscape is much more fragmented as less oriented 
toward a “mass” audience than it was several decades ago.  This shift was reflected in the 
design of this study, in which the stimuli were said to come from a website that would be 
marketed to college students.  It is possible that a media outlet geared toward such a specific 
demographic group was perceived differently than an outlet intended for a more general 
audience would have been.  Future research should investigate this possibility by 
manipulating the presumed reach of newer media sources the same way previous hostile 
media research has manipulated the presumed reach of newspapers. 
One other aspect of this study that has implications for future research is Hypothesis 
3, which tested the selective categorization mechanism that has been supported in previous 
hostile media research.  The results of this study partially supported this mechanism, as three 
of the excerpts taken from the stimuli predicted perceived bias for their respective articles.  A 
review of the excerpts suggests that the excerpts that predicted perceived biases were the 
ones that were, on their own, the most neutral on their respective issues.  Future researchers 
who seek to test this mechanism need to be careful to use excerpts that do not favor one side 
or the other, so that participants can interpret the excerpts biases using the same criteria with 
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which they interpret the articles’ biases. 
The goal of this study was to examine how explicit labeling of media sources 
influenced hostile media perceptions, but it is important to acknowledge that there is a certain 
amount of artificiality in presenting participants with either a liberal, conservative, or neutral 
website without allowing them to choose which website they prefer.  The current media 
landscape is not only characterized by increased ideological identification, but also increased 
media choices.  While there is still controversy over the extent to which people engage in 
partisan selective exposure and selective avoidance (see Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 2010, 
for a brief overview), much research suggests that if people can choose only one media 
source they will tend to choose the source that is most likely to support their attitudes 
(Iyengar & Hahn, 2009).  Holbert et al. speculate that increased choice will change the way 
people process political messages.  Although their argument focuses on processing of 
persuasive messages, it is likely that increased choice will affect how people access media 
bias as well.  Future research should investigate this possibility by manipulating whether or 
not participants are able to choose the media source that provides the stimulus article. 
Limitations 
As with all research, this study has several limitations that must be acknowledged.  
First, all experimental research raises questions about external validity and generalizability.  
It is possible that the results would be entirely different if the study was conducted using a 
sample not drawn primarily from among college students, who may have less developed 
political attitudes than older participants would.  More specifically, research on the hostile 
media effect is problematic when the sample is not explicitly drawn from groups that are 
likely to have strong attitudes on the issues discussed in the stimuli.  For this study, the 
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researcher attempted to recruit participants from student organization that are heavily 
involved with political causes, under the assumptions that members of such organizations 
would be more likely to hold strong attitudes on political issues.  Unfortunately, it was 
difficult to identify gatekeepers who were willing to distribute recruitment materials to 
members of these organizations.  Consequently, participants were drawn from the general 
student populations of the two universities where the research was conducted.  This failure to 
recruit highly ideological participants probably resulted in a less striking demonstration of 
the hostile media effect than has been shown in previous studies.  At the same time, the 
hostile media phenomenon seems to only explain how people with strong attitudes perceive 
media coverage of a given issue.  Including non-partisans in hostile media studies could 
results in a more complete sense of how perceptions of media bias occur.   
More generally, the study suffered from a difficulty in recruiting participants that 
resulted in a slightly lower sample size than would have been ideal.  In terms of the total 
number of participants, the sample size was not insufficient for the analyses done in this 
study.4  Unfortunately, the participants were not even distributed throughout the cells of the 
factorial design.  As noted previously, participants were disproportionately pro-choice, and 
the neutral position on the economy was somewhat over-represented.  As a result, some cells 
in the design were underrepresented.  However, every cell had at least 11 participants in it 
with the exception of neutrals on the abortion issue who were in the conservative and neutral 
website conditions.  Since the hostile media effect is generally conceived of as a 
phenomenon that applies to people who have strong attitudes, the theoretically interesting 
                                                          
4 A post hoc power analysis using the software GPower version 2.1.2 showed that, if the participants were 
evenly distributed throughout the six cells of the factorial design, the sample would have a power of 0.95 to 
detect main effects with a moderate effect size (f2 = .15) and a power of 0.87 to detect interactions in the 
MANOVA with a moderate effect size (f2 = .15). 
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groups are really the pro-life and pro-choice participants, so the lack of participants with 
neutral attitudes toward abortion does not invalidate the results.  At the same time, this 
shortfall limits the strength of the analysis, especially since it would be interesting to see, 
specifically, how people who were neutral on the abortion issue would respond to the stimuli.  
It is plausible that neutrals would be more affected by ostensible labeling since they should 
not be affected by the hostile media effect, although this supposition is called into question 
by the fact that the results for the economy article, which included a disproportionate number 
of neutrals, did not show an effect of the website’s ideological labeling. 
Additionally, the design of this experiment could have potentially struck some 
participants as artificial.  Participants could have been suspicious that the website they were 
asked to evaluate was constructed solely for the experiment and was not really being 
evaluated for actual use.  However, none of the participants expressed skepticism about the 
website either verbally to the researcher or in an open-ended comment field that was 
provided at the end of the survey instrument.  In fact, several participants’ comments seemed 
to imply a belief that the website was real, with one participant even expressing a desire to 
bookmark the site for future reference, so it would seem that the study design provided a 
fairly realistic context for the stimulus. 
An additional limitation was related to the stimuli articles themselves.  Each article 
was designed to offer a balanced perspective on its respective issue.  However, articles that 
simply present different perspectives on an issue may not represent typical news stories.  
Often news coverage of an issue occurs in response to a specific event (e.g., a protest or 
march either for or against abortion rights, the murder of an abortion doctor, the release of a 
government report showing economic growth or stagnation).  Since the stimuli articles were 
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not written in response to any type of event, they may have seemed artificial and may not 
have invoked the kind of involvement necessary to cause a classical hostile media effect.  In 
fact, the specific focus on common ground between people on opposite sides of the issues 
may have tempered any hostile media effects that the participants would have exhibited when 
exposed to more typical media coverage of these issues. 
Additionally, there is the possibility that the results could have been affected by order 
effects.  All participants viewed the abortion article and responded to the dependent measures 
for that article before reading the economy article.  The fact that the articles were not 
counter-balanced is flaw in the design of this experiment.  It is possible that participants’ 
views of the economy article could have been influenced by the attitudes they had already 
formed when reading the abortion article.  This possibility makes it a little more difficult to 
confidently draw conclusions about the results for the economy article.  However, the fact 
that the results differed for the two articles suggests that there was likely no such order effect.  
If participants’ attitudes toward the abortion article influenced their attitudes toward the 
economy article the results would likely be fairly similar.  Although it is conceivable that the 
results would have even more different for the two articles if any possible order effects had 
been eliminated from the study, the notably different results for the two articles indicate a 
lack of an order effect. 
One final potential limitation of this study is that the data were collected over a wide 
time range using students from two different universities.  Participants were recruited at the 
University of North Carolina in the summer and fall of 2009 and at Radford University in the 
fall of 2010.  It is possible that the results could be different for participants at each school 
both because of inherent differences between the students and because the issues of abortion 
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and the economy could have changed in salience over the time lag between data collection at 
each institution.  It is not really possible to quantify these differences, however.  As noted in 
the Results section, the students at Radford were more supportive of free market economic 
solutions than students at the University of North Carolina, although that difference was due 
entirely to a higher number of University of North Carolina students in the economically 
liberal category.  Furthermore, University of North Carolina students (M = 4.94) identified 
more with the Democratic Party than Radford students (M = 3.93, t(142.14) = 3.855, p < 
.001, equal variances not assumed).  Likewise, Radford students (M = 3.65) identified more 
strongly as conservatives than University of North Carolina students (M = 3.10, t(144.21) = -
2.139, p = .034, equal variances not assumed).  As a result of these differences, it would not 
be possible to identify which differences on the dependent variables were due to trait 
differences and which were due to geography or time.   
Conclusion 
This study shows that, at least in some cases, the stated ideology of a media source 
can dictate perceptions of media bias, essentially overriding the traditional hostile media 
effect.  However, the study’s results also illustrate that there is still a lot that researchers do 
not know about what leads to media bias.  The study also suggests that a great deal more 
work needs to be done to understand how the increased ideological nature of media has 
changed the way that audiences consume media.  As Bennett and Iyengar argued, 
The great thinkers who influenced the contemporary field of political communication 
were preoccupied with understanding the political, social, psychological, and 
economic transformations in modern industrial society.  But societies have changed 
so dramatically since the time of these landmark contributions that one must question 
the continuing relevance of paradigms drawn from them … Information channels 
have proliferated and simultaneously become more individualized.  Is it still relevant 
to conceive of “mass media” or has that concept been made obsolete by audience 
fragmentation and isolation from the public sphere? (2009, p. 707) 
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The hostile media effect is one of many theoretical perspectives that are rooted in 
assumptions about media that are no longer accurate.  As noted throughout this dissertation, 
previous research on the hostile media effect has focused on traditional media such as 
newspapers and network television news that project an assumption of objectivity.  
Moreover, this line of research began in an era when media choices were considerably more 
limited than they are now.  As a result, the possibilities that media would express ideological 
affiliations and that audience members would be able to choose media outlets with specific 
ideological leanings have largely been ignored in the literature.   
Bennett and Iyengar argue that the changes in the media landscape “suggest the need 
for theory building” (2009, p. 725), but Holbert et al. contend that this need for theory 
building does not mean “that political communication scholarship needs to start from scratch 
theoretically” (2010, p. 25).  Rather, existing theories need to be adapted in order to 
understand how they apply in the evolving media reality.  This process of theory adaptation 
will happen slowly over the course of many studies.  The study reported here is one of a 
handful of studies starting the task of adapting the hostile media effect.  Although it leaves 
many questions unanswered, its results suggest that ideologically-identified media are 
perceived differently than other media, opening up other potential lines of research that will 
help researchers better understand how perceptions of media bias develop in the 
contemporary media landscape. 
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Table 1. 
Expected Results of MANOVA for the Directional Bias Variable 
 Liberal 
Participant 
Neutral 
Participant 
Conservative 
Participant 
Liberal Website High High High 
Neutral Website Low Moderate High 
Conservative Website Low Low Low 
Note: Higher values indicate great perceived support for the liberal position on each issue. 
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Table 2 
Perceptions of the Abortion Article’s Source Bias 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Pro-Life   -0.83(.972)a                    -0.35(1.598)a, b     0.21(1.358)a              
          n = 12           n = 15  n = 11 
Neutral   0.32(.835) a                -1.10(.960)b         -0.18(.687)a 
         n = 6           n = 9  n = 14 
Pro-Choice   -0.77(.908) a                   -0.99(1.001)a, b     -0.84(1.189)a 
         n = 38            n = 31  n = 31 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means. Higher means indicate greater perceived bias.  Means that do not share a superscript 
are significantly different from each other.
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Table 3 
Perceptions of the Abortion Article’s Directional Bias 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Pro-Life   -0.75(1.084)a                   0.53(.921)b          0.57(.828)b                
          n = 12           n = 15  n = 11 
Neutral   -1.53(1.591)a                0.24(.970)b        0.27(.913)b 
         n = 6           n = 9  n = 14 
Pro-Choice   -0.26(1.001)a,b                 0.20(.854)b        -0.04(1.015)b 
         n = 38            n = 31  n = 31 
 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means.  Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different from each other. 
Higher values indicate great perceived support for the pro-choice position.  
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Table 4 
Perceptions of the Abortion Article’s Argument for Legalized Abortion 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Pro-Life             -0.83(1.403)a                   0.07(1.668)a         -0.18(1.401)a                
          n = 12           n = 15  n = 11 
Neutral              -2.50(.837)b                -0.78(1.787)a,b      0.07(1.385)a 
         n = 6           n = 9  n = 14 
Pro-Choice   0.00(1.054)a                   -0.52(1.589)a        -0.30(1.418)a 
         n = 38            n = 31  n = 31 
 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means.  Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different from each other. 
Higher values indicate great perceived support for the pro-choice position.  
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Table 5 
Perceptions of the Abortion Article’s Argument against Legalized Abortion 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Pro-Life   0.08(1.564)a                   -0.60(1.765)b      -0.64(1.120)a,b                
          n = 12           n = 15  n = 11 
Neutral   1.33(2.338)a                -0.67(1.500)b       0.29(1.326)a,b 
         n = 6           n = 9  n = 14 
Pro-Choice   -0.22(1.109)a                  -0.74(1.527)b      -0.43(1.431)a,b 
         n = 38            n = 31  n = 31 
 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means.  Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different from each other. 
Higher values indicate great perceived support for the pro-life position.  
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Table 6 
Perceptions of the Number of Readers Who Would be Influenced to Support Abortion Rights 
after Reading the Abortion Article 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Pro-Life   1.53(1.438)a                   1.42(1.596)b        1.32(1.625)a,b                
          n = 12           n = 15  n = 11 
Neutral   1.21(2.00)a                1.26(1.771)b       1.51(1.237)a,b 
         n = 6           n = 9  n = 14 
Pro-Choice   1.45(1.491)a                   1.02(1.397)b        .75(1.029)a,b 
         n = 38            n = 31  n = 31 
 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means.  Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different from each other. 
Higher values indicate great perceived likelihood of the article changing readers’ attitudes 
to be more supportive of the pro-choice position. Percentages were converted to a scale of -3 
to 3 for ease of comparison with other variables.  
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Table 7 
Perceptions of the Economy Article’s Source Bias 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Conservative   -0.93(.961)a                    -0.55(1.006)a        -0.38(1.057)a                
         n = 12          n = 27  n = 13 
Neutral   -0.64(.933) a                -0.77(.986)a         -0.63(0.876)a 
        n = 27           n = 27   n = 25 
Liberal    -0.66(.965) a                   -0.62(1.185)a         -0.48(1.316)a 
        n = 17           n = 15  n = 18 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means.  Higher means indicate greater perceived bias.  Means that do not share a 
superscript are significantly different from each other.
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Table 8 
Perceptions of the Economy Article’s Argument for Free Market Economic Solutions 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Conservative   0.58(0.900)a                  0.62(0.870)a         -0.31(1.109)a                
         n = 12          n = 27  n = 13 
Neutral   0.59(0.888)a                0.19(1.331)a        0.44(1.474)a 
         n = 27           n = 27   n = 25 
Liberal    0.81(1.276)a                   -0.07(1.580)a       0.18(1.590)a 
        n = 17           n = 15  n = 18 
 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means.  Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different from each other. 
Higher values indicate great perceived support for the free market position.  
 
 
 
   
113 
 
Table 9 
Perceptions of the Economy Article’s Directional Bias 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Conservative   0.40(1.019)a,b                  0.23(1.095)a        -0.14(1.150)b                
         n = 12          n = 27  n = 13 
Neutral   -0.23(0.979)a,b                -0.39(0.899)a       -0.09(0.960)b 
        n = 27           n = 27   n = 25 
Liberal    0.25(0.878)a,b                0.59(0.886)a          -0.14(1.150)b 
        n = 17           n = 15  n = 18 
 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means.  Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different from each other. 
Higher values indicate great perceived support for the free market position.  
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Table 10 
Perceptions of the Number of Readers Who Would be Influenced to Support Abortion Rights 
after Reading the Abortion Article 
Participant Attitude   Stated Website Bias – Mean(Standard Deviation) 
     Conservative                  Neutral                 Liberal 
Conservative   1.78(1.217)a,b                1.41(1.931)a          2.36(0.446)b                
         n = 12          n = 27  n = 13 
Neutral   0.93(1.475)a,b               1.18(1.642)a          1.80(1.461)b 
        n = 27           n = 27   n = 25 
Liberal    2.23(0.758)a,b                 2.01(1.049)a          1.70(1.377)b 
        n = 17           n = 15  n = 18 
 
Notes: The superscripts a and b are arbitrary values used to identify statistically different 
means.  Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different from each other. 
Higher values indicate great perceived likelihood of the article changing readers’ attitudes 
to be more supportive of the free market position. Percentages were converted to a scale of -
3 to 3 for ease of comparison with other variables. 
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Figure 1.  Structural equation model used to test Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d. 
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Figure 2.  Modified model for consequences of perceiving the abortion article as biased. 
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Figure 3.  Modified model for consequences of perceiving the economy article as biased. 
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Appendix A 
Abortion Stimulus Article 
Abortion Issue Still Stirs Passions 
Jason Smith, Union College 
Friday, March 13; 12:00 AM 
Abortion hasn’t been a central debate in the last few political campaigns, but that 
doesn’t mean that its opponents and supporters feel any less strongly about it. Union students 
and faculty on both sides of the debate say that the issue is always important to them. 
“I really wanted to vote for Barack Obama because I agreed with him on the 
environment and the economy,” said Brooke Schafer, a member of the College Republicans 
who has participated in pro-life protests. “But I ended up voting for McCain because I 
couldn’t vote for someone who supports abortion.” 
Supporters of abortion rights also say that the issue never leaves their radar screens.  
“The Iraq war and the economy seemed to be the most important issues in the last 
election,” said Emily Moore, a member of Students for Reproductive Choice. “But what got 
a lot of us motivated to campaign for Obama was the fact that McCain was so anti-choice. A 
McCain presidency would have meant undoing decades of work for women.” 
More than 35 years after Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court ruling that legalized 
abortion, the armies that have fought for so many decades over this intimate and often 
agonizing issue are mobilizing once again to protest and carry on their unrelenting war.  
While abortion still has the power to influence votes and inspire activism, some 
observers say that abortion supporters and opponents would benefit if they would pause long 
enough to notice what can be changed and what cannot. 
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“The most basic truth is that three decades of debate have done virtually nothing to 
change public opinion on the central issue,” said George McAllister, a political science 
professor who has researched the public debate over abortion.  
“Abortion is legal, and most Americans want to keep it so,” McAllister said. “Much 
as in 1975, less than 20 percent of Americans would make abortion illegal in all 
circumstances. Moreover, no matter how sincere and heartfelt the beliefs of abortion 
opponents, banning it or curtailing access still imposes one group’s religious beliefs on other 
individuals.” 
Some activists have decided to take a more moderate position on the issue. 
“I don’t support banning abortion, but that doesn’t mean the number of abortions 
can’t be reduced through other approaches, and that’s something we should all work toward,” 
said John Walker, a professor of sociology and the faculty advisor for Students for 
Reproductive Choice. 
In fact, McAllister pointed out that, while public opinion has changed remarkably 
little, the abortion rate has steadily declined since 1990. Additionally, studies show that 
women are increasingly aborting earlier in their pregnancies, which should allay some of the 
qualms about late-term abortions. 
“Those of us who oppose abortion have to be realistic,” said Kevin Jones, a senior in 
political science who interned last summer with the organization National Right to Life. 
“Barack Obama won the election, and the House and Senate are overwhelmingly controlled 
by Democrats. Even conservative states like Colorado and South Dakota have rejected pro-
life initiatives. The sad truth is that we’re not going to get a complete ban on abortion any 
time soon. 
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Jones said anti-abortion activists should be willing to support policies that would 
reduce the number of abortions by increasing funding for sexual education, making birth 
control more accessible and providing more financial support for women who want to keep 
their children but cannot afford it. 
“We will always maintain that abortion is murder, and we will always hope for the 
day when it will be illegal in the United States,” Jones said, “but in the meantime the most 
effective way to protect life is to minimize the number of abortions that occur.” 
While many on both sides of the debate cite a desire to reduce the number of 
abortions as common ground between the two sides of the debate, some worry that this 
approach obscures unresolved issues with access to abortion. 
“To the extent that the decline in abortions results from more use of contraception and 
fewer unwanted pregnancies, it is worth celebrating,” said Walker. “Even so, I don’t know 
whether those are the reasons or whether the decline is due to lack of access.”  
McAllister agreed that abortions are more difficult to procure than in earlier decades. 
“Protests, harassment, stigma, and burdensome state laws have chipped away at the 
number of abortion providers,” McAllister said. “In 2005, there were 25 percent fewer than 
in 1992. Back-door methods to limit access to abortion mean the right guaranteed in 1973 to 
all women is marginalized for women in states such as Mississippi, South Dakota and 
Wyoming, where there are only one or two abortion providers.” 
            While many observers may be encouraged to see pro-choice and anti-abortion 
activists finding moderate common ground, some supporters of each side feel that 
compromise has weakened the chances of achieving their goals. 
            “We have a President and Congress that support using taxpayer money to pay 
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for abortions,” said Michael Tarver, a member of the College Republicans. “Obama opposed 
legislation in Illinois to ban partial-birth abortion and even to protect children after they’ve 
been born alive. Now is not the time to water down the pro-life message with rhetoric that 
sounds pro-abortion.” 
            Neil O’Connell, a member of the Young Democrats, expressed a similar 
sentiment from the pro-choice side. 
            “These pro-choicers who want compromise never explain why, exactly, they 
find abortion so morally offensive,” Connell said. “It seems to me they want to make women 
to feel guilty, even when they’ve taken every possible precaution and got pregnant anyway.” 
            While it is unlikely that any major changes in abortion policy will occur any 
time soon, it is clear that the issue still inspires impassioned debate from all sides. 
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Appendix B 
Economy Stimulus Article 
Economic Woes Force Some to Rethink Solutions 
Jason Smith, Union College 
Wednesday, March 13; 12:00 AM 
            Recent worldwide economic woes have revived centuries-old ideological divisions 
about the role government should play in regulating and stimulating the economy. While 
many conservatives still support limited government involvement and allowing free markets 
to regulate themselves, some Union faculty and students argue that pure free market solutions 
are not feasible during extreme economic downturns. 
            “For nearly a generation, the United States has driven growth by deregulating 
markets, lowering tax rates and promoting trade,” said Arthur Stephens, a professor of 
political science. “Whether it was airlines or banks or energy or telecommunications, 
Washington stood aside, believing less regulation would produce prosperity, even at the cost 
of greater income inequality.” 
            While many Republicans, including presidential nominee John McCain, have accused 
Democrats such as President Barack Obama of favoring socialist policies during recent 
elections, some observers say that even many Republican politicians are embracing 
government intervention in the face of economic crisis. 
            “The U.S. government has already, under a supposedly conservative Republican 
administration, effectively nationalized the banking and mortgage industries,” said Neil 
Schmidt, president of the College Libertarians. “And it was a Republican administration that 
pushed for prescription drugs for the elderly, the largest expansion of the welfare state in 30 
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years. Whether we want to admit it or not, America is moving toward a modern, socialist 
European state.” 
            “If we fail to acknowledge the reality of the growing role of government in the 
economy, then we’re fighting 21st-century wars with 20th-century terms and tactics,” 
Stephens said. “I think that the sooner we understand where we truly stand, the sooner we 
can think more clearly about how to use government in today’s world.” 
            “As much as I’d like to blame Obama for the pro-government movement that seems 
to be going on, I think we passed the point of no return before he got into office,” said John 
Jenkins, a senior management major and a member of the College Republicans. “We had the 
irony of a free-market administration doing things that the most liberal Democratic 
administration wouldn’t have done in its wildest dreams.” 
            Cheryl Newman, a professor of political science, said that both political parties have 
begun to rethink their traditional positions on the best ways to solve economic problems. 
            “Republicans are embracing more government-based solutions, but Democrats are 
also becoming more tolerant of free-market approaches,” Newman said. “For example, 
Barack Obama praises the power of free markets while still arguing that a free market was 
never meant to be a free license to take whatever you can get, however you can get it.”  
But other experts on our campus believe that free-market approaches to fixing economic 
problems are still viable. 
            “Eventually the facts will intercede,” said Joyce McDaniel, a professor of economics. 
“The fact that liberalized markets work better than tightly regulated ones will emerge again. 
American politicians will have to recognize that high taxes and stifling regulations slow 
economic growth and kill jobs.” 
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            “It was not the failure of the free market that caused the economic crisis,” said John 
Richards, a professor of marketing. “The market was already distorted and manipulated by 
the state. Whether it was Freddie (Mac) and Fannie (Mae) or laws requiring banks to make 
loans to poor borrowers who could not repay them, lawmakers repeatedly played politics 
with markets, and we are suffering the consequences now.” 
            “For people who support European-style socialism, this is a wonderful opportunity to 
use us as an example,” said Juan Martinez, a professor of international relations. “They will 
say that even the standard-bearer of the market economy, the United States, negates its 
fundamental principles in its behavior.” 
            Other observers note that the American people have not unanimously embraced the 
government’s increased reliance on regulation. 
            “I talked to members of Congress who said they received more calls and emails about 
the bailout legislation than they have on any other issue in years,” said Joan McKinley, a 
communication professor and freelance writer who covers national politics. 
            “America is still a center-right country in many ways,” Stephens said. “Regardless of 
how necessary it may seem now, Americans are not generally comfortable with a lot of 
government regulation. Once the crisis passes, our instinct will be to revert to a more free-
market style of capitalism.”        
Not surprisingly, these different interpretations of the causes of the current crisis lead experts 
to disagree about what should be done to help the economy rebound. 
            “If people believe that it was a pure free market that collapsed,” Richards said, “we 
are bound to see a wave of state controls and regulations that will deepen the recession and 
likely send the great American economy into permanent decline.” 
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            “The Obama administration is caught in a paradox,” said Sylvia Smith, a professor of 
economics. “It is forced to borrow and spend to fix a crisis created by too much borrowing 
and spending. Obama talks about the need for small government, but it will be hard to 
balance the costs of all of these stimulus packages with long-term growth.” 
            Smith said that, interestingly, members of her own academic field have been among 
the most resistant to rejecting free-market approaches. 
            “For years economists who have challenged free market theory have been ignored or 
belittled because they questioned the orthodoxy,” Smith said. “They have been shut out of 
many economics departments and the most prestigious economics journals.” 
            Smith said that the economic downturn seems to suggest that there are flaws in the 
free-market mathematical models favored by many economists. 
            “But despite all of the current evidence to the contrary, the belief that people make 
rational economic decisions and the market automatically adjusts to respond to them still 
prevails,” Smith said. “The financial crash happened very quickly while things in academia 
change very, very slowly. This kind of blind allegiance to free markets has a lot to do with 
economists’ failure to see the crash coming” 
            However, some economists are happy about the slow-moving nature of the economics 
field. 
            “Academia typically moves slowly and carefully and thoughtfully,” McDaniel said. 
“There is a lot of speculation in the press as to why the financial system collapsed, but a lot 
of work needs to be done to figure out what really happened, which dominoes are in front 
and caused others to fall. The responsible thing to do is to wait until we have some 
understanding of what went on here.” 
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Appendix C 
Excerpts from the Abortion Article Used to Test Hypothesis 3 
Excerpt 1  
More than 35 years after Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court ruling that legalized 
abortion, the armies that have fought for so many decades over this intimate and often 
agonizing issue are mobilizing once again to protest and carry on their unrelenting war.   
While abortion still has the power to influence votes and inspire activism, some 
observers say that abortion supporters and opponents would benefit if they would pause long 
enough to notice what can be changed and what cannot. 
Excerpt 2 
While many on both sides of the debate cite a desire to reduce the number of 
abortions as common ground between the two sides of the debate, some worry that this 
approach obscures unresolved issues with access to abortion. 
“To the extent that the decline in abortions results from more use of contraception and 
fewer unwanted pregnancies, it is worth celebrating,” said Walker. “Even so, I don’t know 
whether those are the reasons or whether the decline is due to lack of access.”  
Excerpt 3 
While many observers may be encouraged to see pro-choice and anti-abortion 
activists finding moderate common ground, some supporters of each side feel that 
compromise has weakened the chances of achieving their goals. 
             “We have a President and Congress that support using taxpayer money to pay for 
abortions,” said Michael Tarver, a member of the College Republicans. “Obama opposed 
legislation in Illinois to ban partial-birth abortion and even to protect children after they’ve 
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been born alive. Now is not the time to water down the pro-life message with rhetoric that 
sounds pro-abortion.” 
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Appendix D 
Excerpts from the Abortion Article Used to Test Hypothesis 3 
Excerpt 1 
         While many Republicans, including presidential nominee John McCain, have accused 
Democrats such as President Barack Obama of favoring socialist policies during recent 
elections, some observers say that even many Republican politicians are embracing 
government intervention in the face of economic crisis. 
            “The U.S. government has already, under a supposedly conservative Republican 
administration, effectively nationalized the banking and mortgage industries,” said Neil 
Schmidt, president of the College Libertarians. “And it was a Republican administration that 
pushed for prescription drugs for the elderly, the largest expansion of the welfare state in 30 
years. Whether we want to admit it or not, America is moving toward a modern, socialist 
European state.” 
Excerpt 2 
            But other experts on our campus believe that free-market approaches to fixing 
economic problems are still viable. 
            “Eventually the facts will intercede,” said Joyce McDaniel, a professor of economics. 
“The fact that liberalized markets work better than tightly regulated ones will emerge again. 
American politicians will have to recognize that high taxes and stifling regulations slow 
economic growth and kill jobs.” 
            “It was not the failure of the free market that caused the economic crisis,” said John 
Richards, a professor of marketing. “The market was already distorted and manipulated by 
the state. Whether it was Freddie (Mac) and Fannie (Mae) or laws requiring banks to make 
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loans to poor borrowers who could not repay them, lawmakers repeatedly played politics 
with markets, and we are suffering the consequences now.” 
Excerpt 3 
             Not surprisingly, these different interpretations of the causes of the current crisis lead 
experts to disagree about what should be done to help the economy rebound. 
            “If people believe that it was a pure free market that collapsed,” Richards said, “we 
are bound to see a wave of state controls and regulations that will deepen the recession and 
likely send the great American economy into permanent decline.” 
            “The Obama administration is caught in a paradox,” said Sylvia Smith, a professor of 
economics. “It is forced to borrow and spend to fix a crisis created by too much borrowing 
and spending. Obama talks about the need for small government, but it will be hard to 
balance the costs of all of these stimulus packages with long-term growth.” 
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